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VISIONING BEYOND 2028 TOWARDS

A WORLD-CLASS ARMY

OPERATING IN A MULTI-DOMAIN ENVIRONMENT





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THE ARMY JOURNAL

The Army Journal is an academic journal published bi-annually by Headquarters, Philippine Army with the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO) as the office of primary responsibility. It serves as a tool to publish original research or related literature on subjects relevant to the PA or the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). It also makes such information available to other scholars and researchers. Furthermore, the journal contributes to the advancement and extent of knowledge in the PA or the AFP in particular and the Philippine society in general.

Submissions are not limited to the officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian employees of the Philippine Army and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Articles, notes, from the readers, and book reviews by other writers outside the PA are highly encouraged and greatly appreciated. You may send them to:

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The Army Journal continues to take pride of the milestones reached in the transformation journey of the Philippine Army. We have completed the last basecamp of our 18-year journey towards our vision, and so far, we have seen how far we have gone in collectively mainstreaming a culture of peace and good governance. But we still have a long way to go. We still have more milestones to reach, more goals to be realized, and more battles to win.

To further sustain the current transformation, the Philippine Army developed the Army Transformation Roadmap 2040 or the ATR 2040 with the vision: World-Class. Multi-Mission Ready. Cross-Domain Capable. This was a product of the Strategy Refresh Workshop on May 2022 followed by series of focus group discussions among measure and program owners from different HPA staff and offices. The Army Force 2040 will be a multi-mission ready force focused on ground warfighting, with substantial cross-domain reach, and capable of employing and integrating both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities when fighting inter-service as well as part of a joint, combined, and inter-agency force.

In this issue, the Army Journal features various topics envisioning what the Army is beyond 2028. One article presented the lessons we can apply from the Russia-Ukraine war, and the importance of having a strong reserve component. Likewise, an article on developing a responsive training management system across domains and topics on anti-graft and corruption policies, prevention on terrorism financing, security threats, peacebuilding, and strategic leadership principles were presented.

We are also bringing back the two sections of the Army Journal, the "Notes from the Readers" and the book review. The "Notes" shall feature our readers' reactions and insights to the articles of the previous issue, while the review appraises any relevant local or foreign book which applies to the principles and arguments of the Army transformation.

We invite our dear readers to participate in the discourse, so we could foster a healthy exchange of ideas and contribute to the attainment of our vision **to become a world-class Army that is a source of national pride.** Together, let us unite in our quest to transform the Philippine Army.



COL RONALD M BAUTISTA MNSA (MI) PA
Editor-in-Chief, The Army Journal

Multi-Domain Operationalization: Ground Forces in Philippine Archipelagic Defense

In an archipelagic setup, the maritime domain is the most susceptible to different forms of attack by the aggressor. Denying the air and sea only serves to neutralize the air and naval warfare capabilities of an archipelagic nation, enabling perpetrators to penetrate its defenses unchallenged. If left unchecked, it can cost a country's claim over its territorial waters and the right to exercise its sovereignty. This is currently the biggest challenge in the West Philippine Sea (WPS). Even with the arbitral ruling made by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China remains unswayed and continues their campaign to take control of these waters.

As of March 2022, the Chinese government has three (3) fully militarized bases in the Spratly Islands, more specifically in Mischief (Panganiban) Reef, Subi (Zamora) Reef, and Fiery Cross (Kagitingan) Reef. During a patrol over these islands, U.S. Indo-Pacific commander Admiral John Aquilino said in an interview that these bases were armed with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems. There were also other infrastructures such as multi-storey buildings, warehouses, radar systems, seaports for vessels, and, of course, aircraft hangars and runways for the fighter jets. By establishing these military facilities, China has gained a position of advantage in the WPS. They have extended their defense "bubble" beyond their coastline and can cut days or hours for their naval and air assets to respond to other countries. This is their way of affirming that no other Southeast Asian country, nor their allies, can take hold of the Western Pacific theater and use it against them to monopolize the area of operations.

The Philippines also has its way of keeping its feet planted in the WPS. In 1999, a World War II-era warship was grounded in the Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal. LT-57 or BRP Sierra Madre was stationed there to serve as a military outpost and maintain presence in the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG). Just like any other military facility, it has to be maintained for the safety

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and efficiency of our troops. Rotation and Resupply Operations (RORE) are regularly being conducted in the area, not by using the Philippine Navy's vessels but through wooden boats to prevent the tension from escalating. However, this still triggers China, leading to confrontation by the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG). Most of the time, the BRP Sierra Madre crew is successfully resupplied. But there were instances in which China would stop these supply boats from reaching the shoal by obstructing the path or blasting the boats with water cannons. This, in turn, prompts the Philippines to file a diplomatic protest. Whether this works or not, the resolution between China and the Philippines regarding the territorial dispute remains to be seen. On the other hand, the Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal is not the only military outpost the Philippines has in these waters.

Since May 17, 2022, The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) has been manning three (3) command outposts in the WPS, specifically in the Likas (West York), Lawak (Nanshan), and Parola (Northeast Cay) Islands. Compared to China's seven (7), the Philippines now occupies nine (9) maritime features. This is a good indication that the Philippines, despite its budget constraints and lesser military assets, is deliberately taking a stand against China's monopolization of these waters and remains determined to expand its military capabilities for the protection of its people and national territory.

CHINA'S ANTI-ACCESS/ AREA DENIAL (A2/AD) CAPABILITIES

With the ongoing dispute in the West Philippine Sea, people might assume that China only uses its naval and air assets to maintain its position in the area. But to operate at a strategic level requires the synergy of joint forces. China employs not just maritime and air warfare, but also the other domains, namely Space, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS), and Land. This is a multi-layered defense strategy that denies the enemy's presence in the area of operations.

SPACE

Forging ahead with new technological advances, superpower countries have recognized a new frontier that is deemed vital to national security: Space. This domain requires a different military capability, using the low Earth orbit (LEO) to place military infrastructure that can assist the other domains of warfare. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists' (UCS) satellite database, as of January 2022, there are four thousand eight hundred and fifty-two (4,852) satellites deployed in space. Two thousand nine hundred ninety-four (2,944) are from the United States, four hundred and ninety-nine (499) are from China, and one hundred sixty-nine (169) are from Russia. With China being the second country with most numbers of satellites, they have the ability to closely monitor the activities in the WPS and mobilize their naval and air assets to areas of concern.

China's own satellite constellation, the Yaogan (meaning "remote sensing") series has the following capabilities: optical reconnaissance, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and electronic intelligence (ELINT). According to the Science and Research Journal (2021), these satellites can effectively see through clouds and at night, as well as detect foreign vessels within its coverage. It can also provide high resolution two-dimensional (2D) or three-dimensional images (3D) of terrains and other objects.

While this technology is highly convenient for military surveillance, it is not immune to cyber-attacks. The competition sees this as a desirable target, setting eyes on the information that is being generated and using it against the country itself. It can reveal the weak spots in the defenses and implement a maneuver strategy that will take down the enemy through maximizing the capabilities of assets and preventing casualties.

CYBERSPACE AND ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM (EMS)

Cyberwarfare encompasses a wide range of electronic assault involving computer technology, radar systems frequencies, signals, and the internet. It can refer to attacks on software, databases, and the manipulation of hardware by hacking codes and systems. Meanwhile, information campaigns are designed to extract support from the masses, deceive the enemy, and take down schemes and facades. It is a toe-to-toe battle of gathering information,

intercepting lines of communication, and destroying networks of operations. Just like Space, cyberspace and EMS play a major part in holding off attacks in sea, air, and land.

In 2021, satellite images showed the development in the Mumian Facility of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). This facility is equipped with Satellite Tracking and Communication (SATCOM) platforms which enables the PLA to transmit and receive signals from the satellites. This flow of communication allows for real-time surveillance of the area of operations and the synergizing of troops in the field. It also has Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities that can intercept signals from foreign assets and electronic systems, and can also collect intelligence pertaining, but not limited, to the positioning of troops and assets. This type of system is also installed in the Chinese military bases of Subi (Zamora) Reef and Fiery Cross (Kagitingan) Reef, creating a powerful communication network in the WPS.

Cybersecurity training is the first countermeasure a country can employ to mitigate this commonly invisible threat. By understanding the adversary's information system, one can penetrate these systems from an unknown position without requiring the use of expensive and complicated equipment. Given there is a big allotment in the budget, a country can also spend on research and development to increase an asset's stealth features. Self-reliance defense programs allow military forces to develop their own technologies and prevent enemies from learning their weaknesses. This is evident in Japan, where they manufacture most of their assets in their own country. Not only does this help sustain local industries, but it also encourages the increased production of highly-capable and cost-effective assets.

LAND

The capabilities of ground forces are less likely talked about when it comes to discussions on archipelagic defense. Naval warships, aircraft carriers, and fighter jets take the spotlight during discourses on procurement and strategy. This is partly acceptable since invading an archipelagic country requires offshore combat and amphibious operations. But naval ships and combat aircrafts also need protection. Precise, fast, and heavy fire can take them down and sink them in an instant. Fortunately, land has a unique capability that naval and air assets do not have. As U.S. Army General David Perkins said, islands are "unsinkable ships". It is a permanent position that missile systems can be mounted on and can target

assets that are crossing the air and sea. By thoroughly planning key position areas, naval and air assets can be protected by the missile's range.

Being the southernmost province of China, the Island of Hainan has the closest position to the WPS, making it the ideal place to set up land-based defenses that can deter adversaries in these waters. The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), which started off as the Second Artillery Force (SAF) under the PLA before becoming a separate branch of service, has set up a base on this island and has been conducting multiple ballistic missile tests toward the seas. Although it is unclear yet, the Chinese could possibly be testing their DF-21D missiles with a range of 1,500 kilometers or the DF-26 missiles that have a range of 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers. It is believed that both of these have the power to take down moving ships and severely damage aircraft carriers. Although the lethality of these assets can easily be affected by different factors, it is still a key player in the Western Pacific theater because of the distance it can cover.

Realizing the importance of land-based attacks in staging a battle in the WPS, Western Pacific countries try their best to secure their islands in the Paracel and Spratly's. China will continue to empower its already built facilities and will seek to gain more. The Philippines must do the same by strongly enforcing their proprietorship on their claimed Islands and Reefs, particularly the Second Thomas (Ayungin) shoal. The LT-57 or BRP Sierra Madre has been holding the position for quite some time now and the undeterred conquest of China calls for a more permanent and established occupation in the area.

THE ROLE OF THE PHILIPPINES' GROUND FORCES

Just like China's incorporation of a multi-capable military force, the Philippines is also evolving its warfighting principles. Adapting the multi-domain operations concept, the Philippine Army seeks to be competent not just in ground defense, but also in engaging threats from the other domains. By diversifying its capabilities and doctrine-based procurement of military assets, the Army can provide its own reliable layer of protection in the country's implementation of archipelagic defense.

INFORMATION WARFARE

Although the Philippines lacks the necessary space and electromagnetic assets, it can still effectively

engage in information warfare. There are many channels of communication a country can peruse. Known worldwide as one of the top countries with the highest number of internet users (76.01 million), Filipinos are keen on spreading and receiving information online. This, therefore, includes the internet as a valuable tool for military operations.

During the five-month long Marawi Siege in 2017, the AFP were not just dealing with the enemy's firepower, but also with the disinformation that was spreading online. One downside of urban warfare is prejudicing the safety of civilians, and the enemy saw this chance to discredit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Issues about mishandling the situation and bombardment of bombs leading to the city's destruction cycled the internet. This was picked up by local and international media that made people question the Philippines' leadership and military capabilities. This was advantageous for the Maute group, whose campaign was established on false beliefs and deception. However, no matter how hard they tried, there were still people who recognized the efforts of the AFP and exposed the lies and destruction brought forth by these ISIS-inspired terrorists. The same principle can be applied to our dispute in the WPS. China's nine-dash line claim is not acceptable, given that other Southeast Asian countries also have historical facts and legal bases to support their occupation in the WPS. By continuously projecting this information online, the Philippines can gain support from other countries and boost diplomatic ties and cooperation.

Through the help of the U.S. Army in the Pacific (USARPAC), the Philippine Army has gained a wider perspective on dealing with the cyberspace domain. A five-day Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) regarding cybersecurity and defense capabilities was held in Fort Bonifacio last May 31 to June 4, 2022. This engagement with U.S. provided the Army with lectures and practical exercises that helped raise their competencies in the field of communication, electronics, and information systems.

Besides working with the United States, the Philippine Army is also taking part in cyber defense exercises with the other branches of service through the annual AFP Joint Exercise Dagat-Langit-Lupa (AJEX DAGIT-PA). In line with the AFP's modernization program, this unilateral exercise aims to enhance the capacity of its military personnel to operate newly-procured assets and implement evolved strategies. This is a chance for the Philippine Army and the other branches to compare and synergize their systems for



Autonomous Truck Mounted Howitzer System (ATMOS) 155 mm/52 caliber self-propelled artillery pieces at the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation Area

engaging in information and communications warfare, thereby strengthening the AFP's joint operability in cybersecurity.

AIR DENIAL

Reorganized by the U.S. Army, the Far East Air Force (FEAF) was intended to secure the air defenses of the Philippines. Several air bases were established across the country, with Nielson Field being the headquarters alongside Nichols and Clark Field as the best candidates for developing facilities. However, it did not reach its full potential as a capable air force. Just ten (10) hours after the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Japanese flew again for another mission against the Philippines. From the island of Formosa (now Taiwan), they eased into the Philippine archipelago, used tricks that confused U.S. Forces, and successfully launched a surprise attack on two (2) important FEAF bases. The Clark field, which accommodated heavy bombers, and the Iba Field, which had a radar facility, were easily decimated. Clark Field was caught off-guard while refueling its planes; had the Japanese struck when the FEAF planes were up and running, it could've been a different story. But their time-employed trick proved to be successful and it eliminated a challenge in airspace dominance. It can be noted that there were anti-aircraft guns

in Clark, and having competitive capabilities would have put the land-based assets as the last line of defense. Regrettably, its range was proven ineffective against the Japanese planes. These first events of World War II showed how tricky and lethal air warfare is. It relies on speed and deception by maneuvering the skies undetected and unleashing its firepower with precise timing. In opposing this threat, the ground forces must harbor assets that can challenge the air domain through range and power.

During the 15th anniversary of the Army Artillery Regiment, Philippine Army, (AAR,PA) spokesperson Colonel Xerxes Trinidad announced the activation of a new unit, the 10th Field Artillery, to operate the twelve (12) newly-procured 155mm self-propelled Howitzers from Israel. This is the same technology used by the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), but manufactured and procured from their own country. The Atmos 2000 Howitzers from Israel offer range, speed, and mobility. It has a maximum range of forty-one thousand (41,000) meters, which can deter aircrafts at mid-range. Its Inertial Navigation System (INS)-based gun-laying method ensures stability, while its automatic loader aids in producing a high firing rate of three (3) projectiles per twenty (20) seconds. Mounted on a Tatra 6x6 truck, it is adaptable to rough terrains and is able to maneuver

when change of position is necessary.

The acquisition of this asset enables the Philippine Army to deter enemies in the air domain that may challenge the Philippine Air Force's still-developing capabilities. It has adaptable features that can cover for other domains' weaknesses, which is essential for joint force operability. With a budget-constrained modernization program, the AFP ensures that the assets they procure are multi-capable and cost-efficient. This is the key to maximizing resources in an economic crisis while still prioritizing national security.

COASTAL DEFENSE

In today's warfare, coastal defense is typically implemented by a country's Marine Corps. This sub-branch under the Navy is mainly in charge of amphibious operations, fighting on both land and sea. They specialize in jungle warfare, reconnaissance, and littoral combat. The Army and Marine Corps correlate with each other on the Land aspect, providing fire and logistical support for the maritime domain.

Taiwan, a nation significantly smaller in size compared to China, exemplifies working around limited geography and acquisition capabilities. Since the manifestation of a brewing battle in the WPS, submarines, frigates, and combat aircrafts were expected to take the stage. But with or without a pandemic aggravating the global economy, these are still expensive assets to procure. Hence, Taiwan adopted the so-called Porcupine strategy; simplified as "a large number of small things," the concept behind this strategy is to procure affordable but lethal armaments rather than expensive legacy assets. This defense system will mostly be land-based and reliant on a steady platform for staging a counter offense. Large quantities of anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles are spread out across the coastline, where it can target China's big naval and air assets. The open sea proves to be the biggest challenge in China's invasion, as it exposes them to the firepower positioned across the Taiwanese terrain. This procurement-based and geographically-dependent defense strategy is something that the Philippines can emulate on its own.

Following the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC), the Philippine Army is the next branch of service to acquire the BrahMos medium-range ramjet supersonic cruise missiles from India. Boasted as the fastest supersonic cruise missile in the world, the

BrahMos can be launched on sea, air, and land. Its "fire-and-forget" principle allows it to seek its target without continued guidance from its launcher. Together with its long-range precision and Mach 2.8 top speed, it will be able to attack advancing enemies in the WPS from a safe distance. With the acquisition being processed for the 3rd Horizon (Year 2023-2027) of the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program (RAFPMP), the PA is poised to work alongside the PMC in building a formidable ground-based fire support for the Navy and Air Force.

CROSS-DOMAIN SYNERGY

China's Anti-access/Area Denial (A2/D2) system in the WPS shows how much their military capabilities have improved over the years. Motivated by the will to go head-to-head with the United States, they have employed various military advancements that focus on intelligence gathering, firepower, and geographical positioning. Their reconnaissance satellites provide them enough data and visuals to analyze the force and structure of their enemies while their ballistic missiles give them range and can effectively subdue an enemy formation in the maritime and air domain. Even further, the twenty-seven (27) military outposts stationed in the Paracel and Spratly Islands sustain their troops and operations. This synergy is the foundation of China's stronghold in the Western Pacific theater.

In a Multi-Domain Battle, the key to winning lies in the ability to perform Maneuver Combat. General Perkins from the U.S. Army explains this as the "application of all elements of combat power, all the warfighting functions, along with information and leadership." To penetrate a multi-layered defense system, a military force must be able to find its enemy's weak spot and strike it while it remains undefended. This creates a chain reaction within the system that destroys the relationship between the domains. Without the coordination of the branches of service, it becomes more feasible to take down each domain one by one. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is capable of championing Maneuver Combat even with lesser assets. Through the annual joint exercise, they can maximize the full potential of each domain and its assets, and still make room for further development in the coming years.

Paving the way for Horizon 3 of AFP's Modernization Program, the Philippines is determined to go beyond its current capacity. Along with boosting its Regular

and Reserve Force, it welcomes the competencies and advantage of additional manpower. This is a big leap that the country is willing to take in order to protect its people and national security. Being an archipelagic nation with an abundance of natural resources and geographical advantage, it will continue to defend its sovereignty through the AFP's vision of multi-domain operability.

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Using the Lens of Reservist Motivation as Basis for Developing a Strong Reserve Component

by MAJ GENILO JOSE EDUARDO JAGS (RES)

The Reserve Force is an integral part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), a fact recognized by the 1987 Constitution. Apart from being a base for expansion for the AFP, the Reserve Force also contributes to socio-economic development as well as in relief and rescue during disasters and calamities. Thus, the Reserve Force aptly deserves to be further developed and given importance.

One way of developing the Reserve Force is by focusing on its manpower, i.e., the reservists themselves. Reserve Manpower Development, in particular, involves itself with the development of the reservists' training, promotion, and morale and welfare. Developing these areas can lead to individual and organizational efficiency. Existing policies, laws, and rules would show that there are many ways reserve manpower development is being implemented. All of these can be capitalized upon in order to come up with a focused manpower development program that will make the Reserve Force be composed of members that are highly motivated.

This paper explores the possible areas of focus for manpower development, by primarily looking at factors that: 1) motivate a person to join the Reserve Force; and 2) motivate a person to stay and be active in the Reserve Force. If these highly motivated reservists are the ones recruited and maintained, the Reserve Force will be all the more capable of fulfilling its mission under the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act 7077 (or the "Citizen Armed Forces of the Philippines Reservist Act").

LEGAL BASIS AND IMPORTANCE OF THE RESERVE FORCE

The role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is to protect the people and the State, as well as to ensure the sovereignty of the country and the integrity of its national territory. In particular, the Constitution provides:

"Art II

Se. 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory."

It further mandates that the Armed Forces of the Philippines be composed of both a regular force and a citizen armed force, as stated here:

"Art XVI

Sec. 4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and serve, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State."

The constitutional mandates above are primarily implemented through Republic Act 7077 (R.A. 7077) or the "Citizen Armed Forces of the Philippines Reservist Act." According to this law, the mission of the Citizen Armed Forces (alternately referred to by the law as "Reserve Force") are as follows:

"Sec. 7 ...to provide the base for the expansion of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the event of war, invasion or rebellion; to assist in relief and rescue during disasters or calamities; to assist in socioeconomic development; and to assist in the operation and maintenance of essential government or private utilities in the furtherance of overall mission."

As seen from the above legal foundations, the Reserve Force plays an important role in national security, including socioeconomic development. With the important role of reservists recognized by the 1987 Constitution and laws such as R.A. 7077, there is a need for the continuous development of the Reserve Force.

RESERVE MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT

Reserve Manpower Development relates to the recruitment and training of reservists. More specifically, it has been described as follows:

“Reserve Manpower Development...xxx...[are] the following activities: recruitment, individual training, professional military training, specialization training, AADT, promotions/adjustment of ranks and morale and welfare. Basically, it involves the activities which provide a framework for reservists to acquire or enhance the competencies necessary for individual and organizational efficiency and productivity as well as career.”

As seen in the foregoing, focusing on the Reserve Manpower Development will promote the efficiency and productivity of both the individual reservist and the Reserve Force as a whole. It is thus worthwhile to give importance on this aspect to develop the Reserve Force.

DEVELOPMENT THROUGH TRAINING

On the Reserve Manpower Development aspect of training, Section 52 of R.A. 7077 provides that “each major service shall conduct on a continuing basis nonresident instructions for the purpose of maintaining and updating the proficiency of its reservist officers...”. This nonresident instruction is already seen in the Command and General Staff Course (CGSC) where reservists are allowed to take some parts of the course on a nonresident basis, with the reservists only required to attend daily classes for a few months as compared to their regular counterparts.

Another course having a non-resident aspect that is available to reservist officers is the Strategic Civil Military Operations Officer’s Course. Even before the pandemic, this course was already offered in a hybrid format and has thus produced a number of reservist warrior diplomats.

There are also studies and proposals to further implement the foregoing provision of R.A. 7077 on nonresident instruction. An example was seen by Zumel (2002) who observed that reservists face difficulties in taking both basic and advanced career courses. The study suggested that career courses should be made available to reservists by offering

in various regions. Indeed, a reservist already has great difficulty when attending career courses as it means temporarily leaving their civilian job and taking a leave of absence, or even foregoing their earnings, if they’re a self-employed professional. These difficulties are further aggravated if Reservists would need to travel to Metro Manila to simply take such career courses. Similarly noting the difficulty of reservists in balancing their respective civilian and military careers, Matias (2002) , during a research on AFP NRI Programs for Reservists, suggested that the CGS Course be conducted online for reservists.

These suggestions, made around twenty (20) years ago, may actually be more appropriate at present. The pandemic has shown how technology can be used to facilitate education at all levels, especially for tertiary education and even in post graduate education. One can now earn a degree without physically attending classes every day, as what happens in an open university system. Current technology and methods utilized by open university systems may thus be taken advantage of to provide schooling for reservists in keeping with the non-resident instruction format prescribed under Section 52 of R.A. 7077.

DEVELOPMENT THROUGH RECRUITMENT

There are many programs, both existing and planned, to develop the Reserve Force. One of the most recent and widely known plans of developing the Reserve Force is through the ongoing effort for the enactment of a law to make the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) mandatory again; espoused by no less than Vice President Sara Duterte. Needless to say, making ROTC mandatory in schools will make each student part of the Reserve Force once they have completed the program.

Existing ways of developing the Reserve Force, as explained by Nonato (2022) , includes recruiting reservists from sources other than the ROTC. As explained in the said research, the existing GHQ Circular No. 30, AFP dated December 7, 1987 provides for the procurement of reserve officers, not only from the Advanced ROTC programs, but also from technical professionals such as lawyers, doctors, and nurses for the Judge Advocate General Services (Res), as well as the Medical Corps (Res) and Nurse Corps (Res), respectively.

Another existing way of developing the Reserve Force

is provided by R.A. 7077 itself. While the law was enacted in 1991, it seems that one of its main provisions on reserve force development has not been fully taken advantage of, i.e., compulsory military registration and training. According to Section 14 of R.A. 7077, there should be a mandatory registration of male citizens for the purpose of military training. Subsequent sections of the law then detail how compulsory military training is to be implemented, all leading to the increase in the number of reservists and eventual development of the Reserve Force. Notably, while the law specifies compulsory military training, it also allow volunteers to undergo military training.

LOOKING AT MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS TO FOCUS MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Reserve Force Development also concerns itself with morale. In developing the morale of reservists, one may look at factors that motivate them. It may be worthwhile to look at the study of Griffith, J. (2011) which explains different identities of reservists as applied to the US National Guard. These identifies relate to the reservist's motivation to serve in the reserve force.

Four (4) of these identities listed by Griffith are: [1] the weekend warrior (service is viewed as an alternative to leisure activity and merely a part-time weekend activity); [2] the instrumental volunteer (service is viewed as providing material benefits like pay and job skills); [3] the identity seeker (service gives a sense of meaning and purpose); and the soldier warrior (service as a means to become a war fighter). According to this study, the 'identity seeker' and 'soldier warrior' motivations are positively correlated with the intention to continue military service and being combat ready. On the other hand, the study found that the 'weekend warrior' and 'instrumental volunteer' motivations were negatively correlated with their intentions to continue military service and being combat ready.

These four (4) identities appears to be applicable also to Philippine reservists. The first identity, the weekend warrior, is where the reservist views his role as a weekend activity (i.e., instead of pursuing a hobby on weekends, the reservist would rather spend his weekends by serving in the military). For Philippine reservists, the usual weekly obligation to report for duty is normally conducted on weekends;

this is in recognition of the fact that reservists would likely have civilian careers that they have to attend from Mondays to Fridays.

The second identity is the instrumental volunteer, where the reservist views their military trainings as a platform for acquiring new skills which may benefit his civilian job. The same is true for Philippine reservists who are exposed to various trainings, such as water search and rescue, urban search and rescue, first responder training, mountain search and rescue training, etc. Taking similar trainings outside of the AFP would cost the reservist, taking for example the P2,700.00 fee for Standard First Aid and Basic Life Support Training and P4,000.00 fee for Basic Water Safety and Rescue Training provided by the Philippine Red Cross.

A concrete example is seen in a report made by Cudis, C. (2020) where a reservist with the rank of a Sergeant was able to train for three (3) months for a VIP Protection course through his Community Defense Center. This translated to a civilian job for him as a VIP Protection Agent which he describes as his "bread and butter."

Griffith also portrays a reservist as an identity seeker, where being identified as part of the Reserve Force gives one a sense of meaning and purpose. With reservists doing voluntary work that involves socio-economic development, as prescribed by Section 7 of R.A. 7077, it is easy to perceive reservists as having a sense of meaning and purpose when performing such duties.

Finally, for the soldier warrior, becoming a reservist becomes a means to make oneself a warrior. This is also applicable to some Philippine reservists, as they undergo basic marksmanship training during pre-entry training, such as through the ROTC or Special Basic Citizen's Military Training, and even during regular trainings on Infantry Operations, Mechanize Infantry Operations, Field Artillery Operations, etc.

One can also relate these identity classifications to the Institutional-Occupational motivations of Moskos (1977). Institutional motivation relates to one's sense of obligation, loyalty, and sense of duty brought about by values and organizational practices (such as awards and medals). In which case institutional motivation makes one overcome adversity, such as long working hours and arduous training.

Occupational motivation pertains to a person




Figure 1.

perceiving military service the same as a civilian job. This translates to the soldier expecting adequate compensation for working beyond normal hours and giving importance to bonuses and promotions. According to Moskos, soldiers with occupational motivation tend to be less accepting of the unique military circumstances of working long hours, having arduous training, and being away from family. For the Philippine Reserve Force, occupational motivation may be said to involve the opportunity of a reservist to be Called to Active Duty (CAD), where reservists receive compensation and all the other benefits of those in the regular force. Occupational motivation for Philippine reservists may also be said to involve receiving military ranks, as a number of reservist officers seem to be content with simply having military ranks with little interest in rendering services.

Taking note of these reservist identities identified by Griffith and Moskos' Institutional-Occupational motivation, these can serve as guideposts for Reserve Force Manpower Development. In fact, these have been applied in studying the reserve force of other countries in an attempt to identify areas where reserve force recruitment and development can be improved.

One such study is that of Wish, B. (2014) where the Institutional and Occupational Motivation framework was applied to the US Air Force Reserve. The paper concluded that non-economic factors (i.e., Institutional Motivation) were the leading reasons for joining the reserve force. Bury, P. (2017) also applied the Institutional and Occupational Motivation framework

to the British Army Reserve. His data showed that institutionally motivated soldiers are more likely to remain in the service as compared to occupationally motivated ones. He also found that there are more institutionally motivated soldiers in the British Army Reserve than occupationally motivated ones.

As seen from the foregoing studies, commitment to military service for reservist soldiers of foreign nations appear to be highly influenced by institutional motivation rather than occupational motivation. There is thus good reason for these foreign nations to focus their Reserve Force Manpower Development on institutional motivators rather than occupational ones.

If these same findings are true for the Philippine Reserve Force, it would mean that recruitment and morale enhancement efforts should be focused on Institutional motivations, to which Griffith's "identity seeker" also relates to. This in turn will affect the behavior of reservists, all leading to the fulfillment of the mission of the Reserve Force.

This is supported by the discussion made by Pakozdi, M. et. al. (2022), citing the Motivation Circle (Fig. 1) of Moorhead and Griffin (2008) where it is shown that "needs", and the behavior required to satisfy those "needs," form an endless circle.

CAPITALIZING ON RA. 7077 TO DEVELOP THE RESERVE COMPONENT

Focusing on the identity seeker and institutional

motivators to target recruits, one may capitalize on and promote the mission of the Reserve Force as enunciated in Section 7 of R.A. 7077, particularly on relief and rescue and socioeconomic development. Quoting Section 7 of the law:

“The mission of the Citizen Armed Force, alternately referred to as the Reserve Force, is to provide the base for expansion of the Armed Force of the Philippines in the event of war, invasion or rebellion; to assist in relief and rescue during disasters or calamities; to

role in relief and rescue during disasters and calamities, as well as its role in socio-economic development, recruitment efforts can target those that find meaning and purpose in voluntary service (i.e., identity seeker) as well as those motivated by a sense of duty and organizational values and practices (i.e., institutional motivation). Based on the above-cited studies, reservists of these types are the ones most likely to join and stay active in the Reserve Force.




Figure 2.

assist in socioeconomic development; motivatorsto target recruits, one may capitalize on and promote the mission of the Reserve Force as enunciated in Section 7 of R.A. 7077, particularly on relief and rescue and socioeconomic development. Quoting Section 7 of the law:

“The mission of the Citizen Armed Force, alternately referred to as the Reserve Force, is to provide the base for expansion of the Armed Force of the Philippines in the event of war, invasion or rebellion; to assist in relief and rescue during disasters or calamities; to assist in socioeconomic development; and to assist in the operation and maintenance of essential government or private utilities in the furtherance of the overall mission.”

Thus, by emphasizing the Reserve Force’s primary

ROTC recruitment programs, and even the implementation of the military training under R.A. 7077 (where volunteer training, apart from compulsory training, is allowed), may thus seek out individuals with high institutional motivation and identity seeker characteristics in order to recruit dedicated reservists.

For those already in the Reserve Force, identity seekers and institutional motivation can also be used as a guide in maintaining high morale. Doing so lets reservists participate in meaningful service to society and can motivate them as identity seekers.

Similarly, institutional motivators can be focused on keeping reservists active. Developing one’s sense of duty and organizational values and practices can be met by recognizing the reservists’ efforts and

importance to the organization, such as through awards and medals, and providing opportunities for career courses and promotion. This is consistent with the findings of Pakozdi, M. et. al. (2022) where it was found that appreciation by comrades and society is a constant need (See Fig. 2).

On training, R.A. 7077 already addresses this by expressly allowing reservists to receive schooling through nonresident instruction. The implementation of this may be more feasible now by using modern technology alongside the greater acceptance of online education brought about by the massive shift to remote education caused by the pandemic.

CONCLUSION

Reserve Manpower Development is an important aspect of Reserve Force Development. There are already a number of existing and planned ways to improve the Reserve Force, such as through mandatory ROTC or compulsory military trainings to increase recruits, as well as proposals to make career courses more accessible.

Apart from increasing the number of reservists, it may also be worthwhile to seek recruits that are likely to be more inclined to join and be active in the Reserve Force. This can be done by studying factors that motivate a person to join the Reserve Force and be active in their military duties as a reservist.

Adopting such an approach can facilitate an increase in number of reservists, both in terms of recruitment and for maintaining reservists that are active and dedicated to their military duties. Doing so will lead to a more efficient and strong Reserve Force component.

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MAJ GENILO (RES) is a lawyer who also holds a Master of Laws degree. He practices law in various areas such as intellectual property, labor, data privacy, technology and related litigation. He also teaches various subjects in law school, including remedial law and civil law.

He has taken up various courses at the AFP including the Strategic CMO Officers' Course at the AFP CMO School of the CRS, wherein he was given a commendation for his class standing. He was subsequently invited to teach at the Strategic CMO NCO Course of the AFP CRS. He is also regularly invited to lecture on human rights, international criminal law, law of armed conflict, RA 7077 and other laws by AFPRESKOM.

He has been involved in policy work, being part of the Technical Working Group of OJ9 tasked to craft the implementing rules of RA7077. Exposure in this area inspired him to research on the topic of Reserve Force Development.



A Chance for Change: Formulating Anti-Graft and Corruption Policies in the Philippine Army

by Sophia Ysabel M Panergo

Recalling the past mistakes and blunders of some members of Philippine Army's personnel is not an easy memory to reminisce about. For instance, the issue of graft and corruption in the military is a sensitive topic, mainly because there were numerous graft and corruption cases, especially prior to the creation of the Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR). Such cases resulted in the Army's name being maligned by the public. For instance, in 2004, a 2-star general was accused of amassing an unexplained fortune during his three-year service as the Armed Forces' financial comptroller (Meinardus, 2005). Moreover, the Armed Forces of the Philippine's (AFP) pabaon scandal in 2011 embroiled the Army in ruinous shame to the whole country. These instances have caused an uproar in the military service and gave the Army a negative image. Much more, it has brought dishonor and shame to the organization.

History has taught us that no man nor institution is perfect but what we can do is make change. Change is an elusive concept. Many have tried it, but many also got lost trying to achieve it. Undoubtedly, we humans are not perfect. We need guidance and help from each other. The Philippine Army, likewise, is not a perfect organization. It has its flaws and imperfections; it has committed mistakes in the past. Nevertheless, continuously and vigorously, it tries to change for the better with the support of others.

A GLIMPSE OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY'S BLUNDERS IN THE PAST

More than a decade ago, the Philippine Army was entangled in multiple corruption accusations. This resulted in lower public satisfaction, even warranting skepticism from foreign stakeholders. Additionally, for a time, corruption was said to be a part of the Army by various studies and expert assessments. More so, Zachary Abuza, an expert on terrorism and Southeast Asian security issues at the United States Institute of Peace based in Washington, said that "the military is

clearly unprepared for aggressive island grabs, overfishing or exploration by China." He then continued by saying "there will be little they can do to deter aggressive actions, other than at the diplomatic level." Corruption is claimed to be one of the key reasons why military forces are ineffectual in dealing with internal and international terrorism and why Manila struggles to secure its interests in territorial conflicts, such as the one over the Spratly Islands, which China also claims. (Conde, 2005)

Similarly in 2004, graft and corruption in the military gained notoriety once again after a 2-star general was accused of amassing unexplained fortune during his three-year service as the armed forces' financial comptroller. Ironically, the incident came to light not as a consequence of the Philippine prosecutors' thoroughness, but as a result of an apparent, intentional leak by the US government to local media. Political commentators believed that, at the time, the issue would have been the most difficult test for the Arroyo government. (Meinardus, 2005)

On the other hand, just three years ago, then-President Duterte dismissed 20 military officers for alleged corruption activities at the V. Luna Medical Center (VLMC) in Quezon City. Based on the reports, several high-ranking officials and employees of the VLMC, Health Service Command of the AFP engaged in anomalous equipment purchases and fraudulent transactions, including ghost-purchasing, contract splitting to avoid mandatory bidding processes, and conceiving fictitious suppliers, totaling to P1,491,570.00," as former Presidential Spokesperson Harry Roque said. (Corrales, 2018)

There were also cases of military officials who committed violations on the submission of their Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net worth (SALN), which is important in identifying ill-gotten wealth. In 2013, former military officer, Army Colonel Ceferino Leyritana Layao, was sentenced to one year in jail by

the Sandiganbayan for failing to reveal a monthly income of P9,000. During the time he served as vice president of the Holy Spirit Security Corp., he earned an additional monthly salary of P9,000.00. In his 1996 SALN, he did not reveal this fact. By failing to state his business and financial interest as an officer of the Holy Spirit Security Corp., a corporation lawfully registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Layao was found guilty of breaching Republic Act 6713, the law on the declaration of one's SALN. ("SALN violation: Ex-army colonel gets jail, fine", 2013)

Evidently, these corruption cases have put a toll not only to the Army's name, but also on their capabilities and duties as one of the primary protectors of our land. One may even wonder if the Philippine Army can achieve its goal of being a "World-class Army that is a source of national pride by 2028." Indeed, it is a long road ahead, nor is it an easy road to take, especially when the mistakes of the past remain a specter that continues to haunt the organization. The Philippine Army must, therefore, revitalize and work hard to gain the public's trust. It may be an unending journey but, nevertheless, it is surely worth the effort.

THE ARMY TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP: TOWARDS A MIGHTIER AND MORE RELIABLE ARMY

The Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR) is the result of the Philippine Army's commitment to gradual development. According to the 2010 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, the Philippines was one of the most corrupt countries, ranking number 134th out of 178. Furthermore, the Philippine Army was viewed as an organization riddled with corruption, undermining the Army's capacity to carry out its duty. As a result, the ATR was founded in 2010 to address all of the Army's inadequacies. With the introduction of the ATR in 2021, the Army has revolutionized and sustained advances as it aspires to be a world-class force that inspires national pride by 2028. It has collaborated with many third parties and partners with experience in government service transparency and accountability. These initiatives have had a good influence on the organization. (Palladium, 2018)

Achieving the ATR is truly a monumental achievement. However, the Army encountered multiple challenges along the way. In 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic struck the world with immense fear, harm, and difficulties.

The emergence of the pandemic sparked several concerns about human rights problems, ranging from health, to education, to economic standing, and social life and has prompted world leaders to seek military support. In many cases, the military was expected to assist far more than it did in prior crises. Because the pandemic is projected to be a major national concern for months, and even years to come, it is anticipated that these demands will continue to climb even after the current crisis has ended. When faced with pandemic events, it should be evident that military forces are a significant capability for decision-makers to consider (Clarke, 2020, p.88). The pandemic, until today, remains one of the greatest foes of our country and the Philippine Army in achieving both sustainable peace and its goals. Today, all over the world, militaries are expected to be of greater help in these dire circumstances. As a result, the Philippine Army sponsored various activities throughout the pandemic and has been tasked with providing one of the most essential services it can provide during a crisis, providing transportation to front-line workers. Around 21 trucks were stationed around Metro Manila to assist front-liners in getting to work. (Velarde, 2020, pp. 30-32)

The Philippine Army created the PA Molecular Laboratory in October 2020 to address the health difficulties faced by troops and their families while continuing to explore ways to limit the virus's transmission. The Molecular Laboratory shows the Philippine Army's strong dedication to reducing COVID-19 infections and the value it provides to the country's soldiers. (Army Molecular Laboratory begins operation, 2020, para 1) There has been significant change inside the country in the two years since the outbreak began. During the pandemic, the Philippine Army was always prepared to lend a helping hand to the Filipino people. Despite its difficulties, the Philippines is making progress.

Over the years, the Philippine Army has achieved its wins and losses in combating corruption and making the organization a more trusted organization, but it needs to prove its competence more by asserting and showing its efforts to the public. It should be wary of its past and prove its caliber and honor – that is what the Army Transformation Roadmap is aiming for.

THE OACESPA AT A GLANCE

The role of the Office of the Army Chief for Ethical Standards and Public Accountability (OACESPA) is

to promote professionalism, honesty, and integrity in military service, instill ethical standards, and promote a strong sense of public accountability among both military and civilian personnel in the pursuit of a common commitment against graft and corruption in the Philippine Army. The OACESPA has the authority to investigate complaints and violations by Philippine Army personnel under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019); An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Thereunder (RA 1379); Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials (RA 1379); Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713); Domestic cases with Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act (RA 9262); the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act (RA 7877); the Anti-Rape Law (RA 8353); and violations under the Revised Penal Code Title Seven (Crimes committed by Public Officers) in relation to Article of War 95 (Frauds against Government). The office also has the authority to prosecute infractions of the aforementioned laws, as well as violations of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Military Personnel in the Philippine Army, through the filing of relevant civil and criminal charges. Furthermore, it has the authority to administer administrative sanctions brought against the erring staff, either concurrently or separately. Without the office, complaints and breaches of the aforementioned laws would continue.


The OACESPA is also the primary repository for the Philippine Army's SALNs, which are only submitted once a year. It is one of the criteria used to determine if an Army member has any ill-gotten wealth. Also, the office is responsible for uploading all SALNs in the Philippine Army to the OACESPA Information System for convenient access and retrieval. The OACESPA periodically offers lectures and information drives on how to appropriately fill out the SALN form.

Over the years, the OACESPA has been devoted to countering graft and corruption. One way to carry out the office's responsibilities is to organize training, workshops, and seminars on the prevention of graft and corruption, by spreading awareness, and strengthening the integrity and morale of military personnel. The name OACESPA might sound unfamiliar and even insignificant compared to other offices, but when you try to listen intently, see fervently, and hear with curiosity, the office has a lot to offer in making the Philippine Army a better institution that is worth taking pride in.


CRAFTING AN ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPTION POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINE ARMY

Policymaking is the technical and political process of expressing and aligning the goals and means of actors. Policies are therefore activities that include goal(s) and methods to attain them, irrespective of how effectively or poorly recognized, justified, stated, and formed they are (Howlett and Cashore, 2014, p.17). Thomas Dye (1972) provided the most well-known, clear, and concise definition of public policy: "whatever a government decides to do or not do." The complexity of policymaking is overarching, it is not an easy process. Nevertheless, policymaking can make a difference in this somewhat anarchic world.

In line with ATR's goals, the OACESPA attended a short course on policy formulation and policy analysis from 2-31 May 2022 in partnership with the University of the Philippines National College of Public Administration and Governance (UP-NCPAG). The training program educated the OACESPA personnel with the necessary skills to examine policy challenges, comprehend its numerous components, and employ various tools and methodologies of policy development and analysis. Moreover, the training intended to provide participants with the fundamentals of policy development, especially the creation of internal rules and regulations to assist the application of important policy requirements. The training served as a chance for the OACESPA to contribute to the change and growth the Philippine Army is aiming for and to become an army that is worth taking pride in.



Throughout the training, the OACESPA personnel encountered lecturers with considerable expertise on policy formulation, policy analysis, and pertinent laws on the crafting of an anti-graft and corruption policy. Some of the lecturers were Prof. Dan A. Saguil, Dean of the UP NCPAG; Atty. Leilanie Cabras, Assistant



Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman; Atty. Mark Anthony M. Gamboa, EnP, Assistant Professor, UP SURP; and Prof. Simeon A. Ilago, Director of the UP NCPAG CPED.

There were twenty participants who partook in the training who were then divided into three groups. The whole training revolved around subjects on tools and techniques in policy analysis, drafting an effective policy paper in the AFP, and implementing a policy. Afterward, there were multiple workshops and presentations, resulting in three policy proposals: Whistleblowing Protection Policy in the PA, No Gift Policy in the PA, and Guidelines on the Filing and Submission of Statements of Assets, and Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN).

In reality, the subject matter of the policy proposals are said to be part of military culture. It is therefore difficult to immediately change the system, especially when it is deeply rooted in the organization. It has been noted that, in different countries, there are certain traditions and customs that can be labeled as corrupt but are not considered a crime for others. Taking, for example, the Filipinos' penchant for giving gifts as a way of showing their gratitude to public officials. For many countries, such practices are considered corrupt or wrong. Furthermore, cases wherein nepotism, favoritism, bata-bata, and the palakasan system are widespread in different


public institutions in the Philippines because of customs and practices. However, there should be boundaries of where, when, and how corrupt activities should be labeled. There should be well-written policies on how to identify and grasp corrupt activities. More so, there is a need for the effective implementation and execution of these policies.

The OACESPA policy proposals require great change in the military setting. Although society detests change, it is really the only thing that can usher forward development. One should always keep in mind that culture does not change simply when we want to – when an organization undergoes transformation, its culture shifts to reflect the realities of individuals working together on a daily basis. Culture can still change but it requires the maintenance of good policies and exceptional leadership from the top to the bottom level.

These policy proposals were presented last 16 June 2022 to the officers and other participants from the OESPA Philippine Army Major Units (PAMUs) so that they could comment and recommend the improvement of these policies. Last 16 June, Prof. Saguil, the Dean of the UP-NCPAG, went to the Headquarters Philippine Army (HPA) and gave a lecture on Graft and Corruption Risk Assessment and Risk Management Training. The training also served as a continuation of the conversations

between the OACESPA personnel and the UP-NCPAG and was ultimately about how to efficiently combat graft and corruption within the organization.

Truth be told, the training was far from smooth sailing. The OACESPA personnel went beyond the distance to draft such policies, and went to different Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) OESPA offices, like the Philippine Navy and Philippine Air Force. They also emailed numerous senators and politicians' alike to understand why the country's Whistleblowing Bills have not yet been passed into laws and whether or not OESPA offices should have a gift-giving policy. Furthermore, the OACESPA personnel encountered numerous errors during the writing process, but each mistake paved the way for the making of a better policy. Currently, the OACESPA is still discussing, revising, polishing, and reworking the said policy proposals. Nevertheless, with the help of the UP-NCPAG the proposals are on their way to being completed and presented.



The battle of ending corruption is still far from over, but what we can do as part of the organization is to be better. We live in a world where everything is uncertain and where change is inevitable. The policy formulation course of the OACESPA, in partnership with the UP-NCPAG, aimed to adapt to the changing times, develop greater empathy with fellow soldiers and civilian personnel alike, and make a change. In reality, no one actually lives in solitude and no one is perfect. We need one another to bring about change, small and big.

CONCLUSION

The primary duty of the Philippine Army is to protect the Philippines and serve the Filipino people with

utmost devotion and integrity. Thus, they are compelled to investigate within and beyond themselves. Furthermore, as they investigate, they realize their willingness to always serve and help others and to do good. Some may have committed mistakes in the past and attempted to help the organization by going the distance with grandiose promises; however, many have failed to live up to such promises. As a result, the organization must begin with small changes and work its way up to big changes.

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Terrorism and Terrorism Financing

by **ILT CAROLINE NACIONAL PA**

The global war on terror on various fronts has continued as we have witnessed the atrocities in Syria, Afghanistan, and in many other countries with their horrible stories broadcasted in mainstream media. In such reporting mechanisms, many aspects of war are often covered, such as those largely concerned with immediate events, evolving trends and predictions for new waves of terrorism, or possible causes of the phenomenon. Rarely however, is terrorist financing (TF) delved into. Yet, it is a very significant aspect on how terrorism is supported and sustained. Across Southeast Asia, foreign terrorist fighters from countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Middle East continue to target the Philippines as their destination.

TERRORISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

In July 2014, local terrorist groups (LTGs) pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in the Philippines (ISIS-P), also known as the Dawlah Islamiyah (DI), under the command of their former commander Isnilon Hapilon. On 28 February 2018, the DI was designated as a foreign terrorist organization with a principal purpose to establish an Islamic state in the Philippines governed by Shariah law. To accomplish its objectives, the LTG continues to commit attacks against military forces and civilian targets in the Philippines, including armed assaults, killings, and bombings, sometimes even involving suicide bombers.

Based on the 2nd National Risk Assessment, the threat of terrorism in the Philippines is graded high, given the high frequency of violent incidents related to terror/threat organizations. Prosecution of cases involving mentioned groups is at a low level in comparison to the number of instances and victims recorded. Likewise, since terrorist/threat organizations in the country appear to have a systematic and established technique of generating cash for their operations, the threat of terrorist finance is also graded as high. The estimated quantity of money earned through unlawful operations is substantial. The overall

amount of funding raised by these organizations is unknown, however, the Philippine National Police (PNP) suggests that these terrorist/threat organizations are well-funded because of the large number of threat occurrences reported. The Philippines' vulnerability to terrorism financing is high based on the overall assessment of factors such as the low number of reports and limitations on spotting TF transactions. But the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) and law enforcement authorities (LEAs) are unable to use existing legal remedies to combat TF due to various issues. Furthermore, the inability to investigate and prosecute terrorism and terrorism-related cases is due to a lack of resources and capacity.

TERRORISM FINANCING

The AFP Resource Control Operation (RCO) Support Plan of 2017 was crafted to decrease terrorist groups' financial and logistical capabilities. However, it does not propose a clear, precise idea or mechanism for conducting RCO for the Philippine Army. Thus, operatives on the ground frequently employ Threat Personality-Centric tactics to counter terrorism financing (CTF). The CTF was then incorporated in the AFP's RCO Support Plan 05-2020 in support to the National Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Strategy (NACS). This is to significantly reduce terrorist groups' primary means of sustaining their organizational objectives and use of their financial and logistical capabilities. The issue on the flow of terrorist funding in the Philippines, however, persists.

Sec. 4 of RA 11479 states the following: "Terrorism is committed by any person who, within or outside the Philippines, regardless of the stage of execution: a) engages in acts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person, or endangers a person's life; b) engages in acts intended to cause extensive damage or destruction to a government or public facility, public place or private property; c) engages in acts intended to cause extensive interference with, damage, or destruction to critical infrastructure; d) develops, manufactures, possesses, acquires,

transports, supplies, or uses weapons, explosives or of biological, nuclear, radiological or chemical weapons; and e) release of dangerous substances, or causing fire, floods or explosions when the purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate the general public or a segment thereof, create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear, to provoke or influence by intimidation the government or any international organization, or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic, or social structures of the country, or create a public emergency or seriously undermine public safety, shall be guilty of committing terrorism.

Freeman establishes a theory of TF and identified criteria for evaluating its various sources, particularly in terms of their benefits and drawbacks to the terrorist organization. These criteria are then used to classify terrorist finance into four categories: state sponsorship, illegal activity, legal activity, and popular support.

In the Philippines, a person involved in TF is anyone who “directly or indirectly, willfully and without legal justification, owns, provides, collects, or uses property or funds, or makes property, funds, financial services, or other related services available through any means, with the unlawful and willful intent that they be used, in whole or in part (R.A. 10168) to commit or assist in the commission of any terrorist act by a terrorist organization, group, or association by an individual terrorist.”

Clarke provides a three-part paradigm for terrorism finance. The framework’s first section examines how terrorists and insurgents finance their organizations. Terrorist and insurgent organizations use a gray economy comprised of both licit and criminal activity. The gray economy is mostly concerned with diaspora assistance, charitable organizations, fraud, legitimate companies, and money laundering. Along with illegal activities, insurgents and terrorists rely on elements of the “dark economy,” primarily on various aspects of transnational organized crime, such as human trafficking, narcotics smuggling, gun running, money laundering, extortion, coercion/intimidation, kidnapping for ransom (KFR), corruption, and cybercrime.

The second section of the framework evaluates how these groups spend the money derived from the gray and dark economies. After all, insurgents require money to undertake effective operations. The funds are used to pay rebels’ salaries, purchase weapons and equipment, bribe corrupt officials, care for the relatives of assassinated or captured terrorists, and give social services. Numerous finance sources are accessible to insurgent groups, particularly those willing to commit crimes. The framework’s final section examines how governments and their counterinsurgency (COIN) forces are able to prevent insurgents from acquiring critical resources. It also delves into how factors such as porous borders, sympathetic domestic and diaspora communities, and benevolent state sponsors provide insurgents




Figure 1. Clarke's (2015) Framework of Terrorism Financing

with the resources necessary to sustain the insurgency and profit from conflict.

Terrorist financing mechanisms range from lawful to illegal. Terrorists typically operate in obscurity through restricted networks and opaque industries. Terrorists, on the other hand, offer highly profitable incentives such as counterfeit cigarettes, counterfeit commodities, illicit substances, and charity. Terrorists, according to Forman (2006), are always looking for ways to launder their earned assets through nontransparent trade and alternate remittance channels (such as hawala) or underground banking institutions. Terrorists require funds to purchase weapons and cover operational costs such as recruitment and training and salaries and rewards. The Asia/Pacific Group Report provides regional typologies on TF approaches to help governments and other AML/CTF stakeholders understand the nature of existing and emerging TF risks. According to data gathered by the APG from various agencies and countries, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United States, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) principal source of revenue is from the land it occupies. In late 2014, ISIL gained access to an estimated half a billion dollars in cash kept at state-owned banks through the appropriation of funds stored at state-owned institutions. The exploitation of oil fields also yields significant revenue for the ISIL, particularly in the early stages of its control. Their research details additional sources of money for ISIL's terrorist actions and ongoing investments in its infrastructure and governance requirements.

Moreover, based on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report, the ISIL derives the majority of its revenue from three sources, "listed in order of magnitude: (1) illicit proceeds from territory occupation, such as bank looting, extortion, control of oil fields and refineries, and robbery of economic assets, and illicit taxation of goods and cash that transit territory where the ISIL operates; (2) kidnapping for ransom; (3) donations, including by or through non-profit organizations". These cash streams are erratic and fluctuate in response to economic conditions and the outcome of coalition military operations against them. Islamist groups display the fractured nature of the Moro-Islamist insurgency in the Philippines. In their fight against the Philippine state, Islamist groups frequently target soldiers and police officers. The Moro-Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, dissidents who refused to join the peace process), the Islamic State (IS), and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) are also targeted by rival Islamist groups, often

driven by the differences in viewpoints on whether to engage in peace negotiations with the Philippine government. According to the data set of Islamist Groups, all of the incidents targeting vehicles were directed against security forces or pro-government paramilitary militia members, including ambushes against those traveling by motorcycle. This indicates the focus on kidnap-for-ransom, in comparison to extortion for funding, most notably by the ASG in the Southern Philippines, the Malaysian state of Sabah, and in the waters in between. However, there is no data that can provide the complete security picture. Though not all incidents get reported in news and social media outlets, other sources confirm that IS-affiliated groups in Mindanao are known to carry out larceny, extortion, and the trafficking of arms and drugs. The Mautes and their extended families reportedly ran a mix of black market and legitimate businesses; the BIFF were known to allegedly seize farmland and steal cattle.

LOCAL TERRORIST GROUPS

Terrorism is becoming more complex in the age of globalization. The DI in Mindanao began their violent extremist activities sometime in May 2016, when it claimed responsibility for an attack on a military base in Basilan, Mindanao that killed and injured soldiers. This was followed by five months of combat in the City of Marawi against the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which killed over 1,000 civilian lives and displaced over 300,000 civilians. The Dawlah Islamiyah recruited and trained new members, used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to attack civilians and targeted security forces, and staged suicide bombs as their continued efforts to recover from battle losses. Ten people were killed in Basilan in July 2018 and 23 more people died in January 2019 in the Jolo Cathedral, Sulu, both caused by suicide bombing incidents perpetrated by the terrorist group.

Recruitment of members of the LTG Dawlah Islamiyah (DI) in the Philippines was reported to have been through the exploitation of poor economic and social conditions in Mindanao. Some members were recruited to join the DI due to their ideological support for the Islamic State, while other local recruits were drawn by the DI's ability to provide economic livelihood. The financial resources of the DI are not only provided by the Islamic State, but also come from their kidnap for ransom activities and local extortion ventures that generate money.

In terrorism studies, first hand literatures are limited.

In a similar manner, there are only a few resources and literatures that focus on terrorist financing. Scholars in terrorism suggest that terrorists do raise funds ; however, accurate data on these efforts is difficult to obtain because these financial operations are conducted in absolute secrecy. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, several Islamist LTGs carried out assaults in 2020. This could imply that their operations continue despite the lockdowns, as terrorist actions cannot be operationalized without cash and backing. The threat posed by TF is significant, as LTGs in the Philippines appear to have a more organized and methodical manner of funding their operations. LTGs mostly fund themselves through illicit acts, with kidnapping for ransom and extortion being the favored methods. The Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress affirmed a report from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that the ISIL-East Asia (EA), which includes ISIS-P, instead relies on overseas assistance during this pandemic but will most likely continue to rely on its traditional financial resources, i.e., remittances through criminal activities like kidnap for ransom and extortion. Since the LTGs' collaboration with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1990, one local terrorist group in the southern Philippines, particularly the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), has thrived. Its terroristic acts, ranging from kidnapping for ransom to suicide bombing, are all aimed at gathering income from families that pay ransom money to international terrorist organizations through mediators (foreign terrorist organizations or FTOs). According to reports, the ASG, particularly those members aligned with Daesh-Inspired groups, film their atrocities, such as the beheading of kidnap victims and staging IED attacks/ suicide bombings and send these videos to the Islamic State Central as proof of adherence for the support given. Moreover, the Daesh-Inspired ASG sold their own firearms and those recovered from government security forces during encounters to finance their administrative and operational requirements.

While the exact money raised by these LTGs is unknown, the great number of threat occurrences reported by LEAs suggests that these terrorist/ threat organizations are well-funded. LTGs may also raise capital through legal means. The employment of non-profit organizations, family funding, and legitimate corporate fronts are all examples of fundraising strategies. The Daesh-Inspired LTGs, for instance, receive food and money from families, relatives, trusted contacts, supporters, and sympathizers in the absence of funds generated from kidnap for ransom activities. Similarly, the use of legal businesses

(especially non-stock, non-profit) as front companies has also been recognized as a method for terrorist organizations in the country to route funding. Zakat is a duty that requires individuals to donate a set percentage of their money to charitable causes each year. Most generous Muslims who give Zakat are unaware that some of their payments go to terrorist organizations. Funds are typically used for operational goals, such as acquiring weapons and vehicles, rather than for financial gain. Additionally, LTGs spend a portion of the money earned to benefit the areas in which they operate. The LTGs provide these communities with basic requirements, livelihood support, and even educational opportunities. In exchange, communities protect them from government forces, even if these communities are aware of the funds' nature and source. These LTGs use the money for training, both within and outside the country.

From 2018 to 2019, the AMLC investigated about 325 foreign nationals suspected of terrorism and terrorism financing. Two hundred ninety-six (296) foreign nationals have been blacklisted; 10 are currently detained; and seven (7) have been deported to their respective jurisdictions. The local LEA has identified 44 foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) working with the local Daesh-inspired groups. This includes 24 Indonesians, seven (7) Malaysians, four (4) Saudi Arabians, two (2) Singaporeans, one (1) Pakistani, one (1) Bangladeshi, and five (5) others of unknown nationalities (2nd NRA, 2017). The 2021 risk assessment update evidently showed a surge in suspicious transaction reports (STRs) from September to December 2020, months after the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020. Hence, the overall risk of the Philippines to terrorism and terrorism financing is high.

CTF STRATEGY

Since 2017, the Philippine Army has intensified military operations against the remaining components of all LTGs by implementing its operational directives. It directed all tactical units to expedite the neutralization of assigned LTG individuals implicated in the fund generation scheme. Additionally, it designated its specialty enabling unit, as the capable unit responsible for studying and developing policies/ directives/ standard operating procedures to effectively counter LTG resource generating strategies. To better comprehend terrorism financing and perform CTF operations effectively, the PA has adopted the Financial Action Task Force's suggested framework approach. The cycle of terrorist financing




Figure 2. Lormel's Terrorist Financing Flow of Fund (Lormel, 2018)

is as follows: raise, move, store, and spend. This mechanism is necessary to prevent, investigate, and neutralize the LTG's flow of funds, thus inevitably contributing to the organization's financial intelligence (FININT) capability.




Figure 3. AFP RCO Concept

On the other hand, the AFP's RCO 2017 concept, which consists of four (4) phases: identification, validation, intervention, and assessment. The Philippine Army significantly contributes to the AFP RCO. Its key contribution is the FININT it gives to other

LEAs, which typically initiates or assists an existing TF investigation, culminating in asset freezing, filing of cases, or forfeiture of assets. In light of the AFP's RCO, the Philippine Army has been tasked with strengthening its skills and becoming more efficient in CTF against LTGs. This involves institutionalizing its data collection methods and implementing TF policies and channels.

One of the key elements of anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing regimes is the requirement for financial institutions and other designated non-financial businesses to report transactions they deem suspicious of being related to criminal or terrorist activity. Because of the level of confidentiality traditionally attached to financial transactions, and because reporting entities do not always have the means to substantiate their suspicion, it has proven difficult to report directly to the authorities in charge of enforcing criminal laws. The International Monetary Fund suggests that governments must establish a specialist organization, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), to process financial information that may be linked to criminal or terrorist activity. FIUs, in their most basic form, are agencies that collect complaints of suspicious transactions from financial institutions

and other individuals and entities, analyze them, and disseminate the resulting intelligence to local law enforcement agencies and FIUs in order to combat money laundering. FIUs, as a government agency, must maintain adequate independence to achieve their goals without undue intervention or influence to accomplish their objectives. Relatedly, the institutionalization of the Terrorism Financing Branch in the Philippine Army will integrate all information about terrorist financing by creating a consolidated database system to deliver the necessary data to the units responsible for CTF operations. It will also ensure that Special Intelligence Units and Tactical Intel Units are compliant in regards to the RCO's line of effort and operations. Hence, developing strategies, regulations, guidelines, and training directives for combating LTC's terrorism financing by the TF branch will provide uniform measures in the organization and shall offer intelligence operatives the essential skills and expertise needed for FININT.

The issues explored in this paper emphasize the broader concept of terrorism in the Philippines and, more specifically, the concept of TF. Before discussing the local terrorist groups and their financial strategy, Freeman's idea of terrorism finance was also elucidated. It is evident from the preceding discussion that there are various methods in terrorism financing, including fund-raising, the transfer of money, and their utilization. Undeniably, terrorism financing is a covert crime that could pose a grave threat if efforts are not done to prevent it. To prevent the escalation of terrorism financing and money laundering in the country, these issues must be dealt with appropriately. The question that now remains is how high of a priority should the Philippine Army place on these strategies?

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The Philippines: Caught in Between and Its Perplexed Security Situation with US and China

by COL GLENN JOY U AYNERA and
Margeux Yee

The Philippines' current security situation is somewhat perplexing. It has a treaty with the United States (US), known to have the most powerful military in the world, called the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). Nevertheless, another powerhouse in the east, the People's Republic of China (PRC), with an equally powerful military, is routinely intruding on Philippine-claimed territorial waters in the West Philippine Sea. This constant intrusion of PRC's maritime militia continues to exasperate and distract Filipino fishermen. According to reports, their fishing boats, if not rammed, are being cannoned with water, thus disallowing access to resource-rich waters. This territorial water is glaringly within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. And when the chance opens, they deliberately inhabit Philippine-claimed seascapes in the said area.

This situation enthused up so much doubt and hesitation that global energy corporations and conglomerates, generally comfortable with dealing with such situations, have ceased to pursue research and other exploration projects in the said contested zone. In fact, the termination of the oil research and exploration in the disputed waters is believed to have shaken the economic ties between the Philippines and the PRC. However, the fact remains that the PRC is still the biggest economic partner and contributor to the country's fight against COVID-19. Meanwhile, the US has presented its treaty with what seems to be an uncertain backing by not disclosing details of their scope of aid and support should the situation escalate. There was no doubt that the most obvious reason for this uncertainty was former Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's so-called "parting" from the West, specifically the US. In the recent past, the former president detached Manila from its association with the US capital, Washington, DC.

However, another more evident reason for this circumstance was the lacking state of America's armed forces' external defense forces. Its lack of external defense capabilities has been the real basis of the Philippines' powerlessness. However, another

more evident reason for this circumstance was the lacking state of America's armed forces' external defense forces. Its lack of external defense capabilities has been the real basis of the Philippines' powerlessness to confront China's actions in the West Philippine Sea. Nonetheless, this ambiguity that has exhausted the Philippine-US mutual defense treaty of its power in deterring external forces has aided the country for several years. Coupled with a swing at the United States' calculated views of China, a breath of fresh air may give the accord a grip on maintaining peace and stability in the Philippines, a flash point of the Southeast Asia region. Coincidentally, some matters have started to change; though the country has an ambiguous understanding of what the US can offer, we are also dealing with the increased pressure of pleasing our biggest economic partner, China. The Philippines has no choice but to maintain a striking balance between the two superpowers and ultimately establish a self-reliant defense posture on its own.

ROAD TO RELIANCE

More than seven decades ago, the United States and the Philippines agreed on what would become one of the world's oldest treaties on mutual defense, celebrating its 70th-anniversary last year. Yet, the Philippines never meant for the agreement to be its only shield against foreign hostility. During the Second World War, at the time the treaty was made, the leaders of this country were wary of Japan's attack and invasion. But after only 15 years since the war, the Philippines built not only one of Asia's most capable armed forces, but also one with impressive external defense capabilities. Undeniably, the Philippine Air Force was the first among its neighbors to obtain jet aircrafts, which were utilized throughout the Cold War. During the first part of the 80s, the Philippine Air Force had in its inventory sixteen F-5 and twenty-four F-8 fighters, all undoubtedly sophisticated during those times. Furthermore, the Philippine Navy had a dozen offshore patrol vessels, ten corvettes, and two frigates. By 2005, only a few left in inventory existed and were available for use; the Philippine Air Force

had no more more jet aircraft capabilities while the Philippine Navy only had four offshore patrol vessels that they could hardly depend on.

The means by which the Philippines' external defense forces arrived at such an all-time low can be ascribed to multiple factors: the culmination of the Cold War, the nation's need to fight the growing insurgencies, and the steadily low financial support provided for the Philippine Armed Forces. Still, dissimilar to other U.S. defense-treaty allies, like Germany, the Philippines did not pursue to keep American military forces nearby. Making matters worse, aside from shrinking military capabilities, was the diminishing inventory of equipment. As a substitute, the country evicted US forces in a fit of pro-independence and displeasure from its bases in 1991. Thus, the Philippines — lacking self-owned external defense forces or those of the United States — was left completely reliant on the terms of its mutual defense treaty with the US to dissuade and prevent any possible foreign invasion.

Today, the country has slowly begun to restructure and acquire its external defense forces and capabilities, following the country's win in the arbitrary ruling and gaining international appreciation. The Philippines' Armed Forces and Major Services, namely the Philippine Air Force (PAF) and Philippine Navy (PN), have acquired several external defense capabilities. Even the planners and resource managers of the Philippine Army (PA) have increasingly reviewed and developed territorial defense doctrines in order to complement their acquisition of territorial defense capabilities. Increased interests in strategic and national security studies, information operations (IO), cybersecurity warfare, and most significantly, amplified interest in joint and interoperable land-sea-air capabilities.

UNFORESEEN AMBIGUITY

There is no doubt that partaking in a mutual defense treaty with the US, the world's most powerful military, is valuable and beneficial, but being completely reliant on it can also inspire ambiguity. Even the slenderest uncertainty in the treaty's contents could implicitly deteriorate Philippine security. The refusal of the US to disclose how soon they would send help or to what level of escalation in the intrusions or encroachments of the Eastern powerhouse brought more unforeseen ambiguity on the part of the Philippines. Unfortunately for the Philippines, despite being at the flash point of this maritime concern, the treaty still encompasses numerous unclear details.

Aware of this dichotomy, China has taken advantage of the situation to pursue its goals in the South China Sea. Thus, the Philippines has long pursued Washington's explanation of the contents of the treaty, as some are calibrated and strategic. Still, the question remains: exactly what would the US be willing to protect? The Philippines' territorial waters, its EEZ, its bigger maritime claims in the West Philippine Sea, or only some portions of it? Others questions are tactical: How would the United States respond to non-military forces, like the maritime militia or Chinese Coastguard, if they were to take hostile action against Philippine forces?

cs. Short of a straightforward mutual defense treaty, the Philippines has had few choices in dealing with foreign advances on what it considers sovereign territory— something that has frustrated and disappointed the policymakers of the country. All things considered, the mutual defense treaty has been described and believed to be an “unfair” arrangement between the Philippines and the United States.

UNCERTAINTY ACKNOWLEDGED

With the recent installation of a new administration in the Philippine government, President Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr expressed his willingness to renew the country's relations with the US, despite the uncertainties of the MDT. He has since wished to push for a review of the said treaty. Certainly, the revealing security situation in the Philippine-claimed EEZ and the rest of the West Philippine Sea, under which the US would come to help Manila, is a resource-intensive matter. The US must consider the precedent-setting implications of its security pledges, not only to the Philippines, but also to other American allies. At the same time, the Philippines must put a premium on its economic relations with China, as it is undoubtedly its biggest donor and is strategically supportive of its military build-up. Even so, Washington seemed strangely collected inspite of uncertainty in the treaty's contents— probably because they saw some benefit in the uncertainty. From the point-of-view of the US, the Philippines' weak external defense will encourage the Philippines to use its mutual defense treaty with the United States— its only form of real power —to prioritize claims in the West Philippines Sea. In short,By openly supporting such claims through the treaty, Washington fears that Manila might make a confrontational act that could, whether intentional or not, bring the United States

into a confrontation with another country, most disturbingly China.

To enlighten observers and scholars, the United States' unwillingness to explain the treaty's specifics could be viewed either as Washington's way to prevent Manila from taking certain actions or, if one were to expand the thought, as a form of leverage where the US can use in its dialogs with the Philippines over other issues. Logically, neither one bodes well for Manila. However, if the strategic environment were to change, then Washington's calibrations would likely change too. After all, it was after Japan took concrete steps to reinforce its military capabilities in the East China Sea that the United States became more vocally sympathetic to Japan's claims in the area.

CHANGING SECURITY SITUATION

A Shift in American Strategic Sentiment. In the meantime, how the United States perceives its relationship with China has also altered. For much of the last 25 years, the United States has hoped that globalization would turn China into an "accountable participant" and transform Chinese attitudes on many matters of concern, including sovereignty disagreements in the West Philippine Sea. However, it wasn't so. Acknowledging this, together with the understanding that China had become a viable threat to the United States, shifted US strategic sentiment towards China by the late 2010s. During Donald Trump's tenure, the US became categorically less concerned with gliding around China's self-proclaimed main interests. So far, President Joseph Biden has continued his predecessor's tougher line against China. Early on, the Biden administration expounded that the Philippine-US mutual defense treaty would necessitate the United States to help Philippine security forces if China's maritime militia were to invade.

In July 2021, the US restated their treaty pledge as well as its security policy which believed nearly all of China's maritime claims in the South China Sea are unlawful. All of which propose that the Philippines can assume an easier time securing American provision in the years to come.

Worldwide Acceptance of Philippine Claims. In the same manner, the Philippines reinforced its grasp over its mutual defense treaty with the United States in another way. In 2016, the country won the arbitral case against China's "nine-dash line" claim in the West


Philippine Sea at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). While much of the consideration that the PCA ruling received has been focused on its nullification of the Chinese claim, it also lifted and encouraged Philippine maritime claims. The legal decision affirmed the Philippines' sovereign rights within its EEZ and confirmed Philippine fishing activities in Scarborough Shoal to be lawful. Such worldwide acknowledgment has given Manila a leverage in its treaty alliance with Washington. The more global recognition the Philippines can gather for the said claims, the harder it becomes for the United States to not include them under the treaty.

Restoring Philippine Military Might. Though the Philippines' new military assets may still be too frail to give China much reason for grave concern, Manila's efforts to build its external defenses does send a clear message to the United States of real commitment and pledge. They also help change the Philippines' security partnership with the United States. Short of the Philippines' total reliance on the mutual defense treaty, US policymakers can no longer depend on the treaty's uncertainties to take action as either a limitation or leverage over Philippine actions. By strengthening and toughening the country's external defense forces, the Philippines greatly induces explanations from the United States on the uncertainties found in the treaty. In the meantime, while waiting for the US to expound the scope of their support in the treaty, Philippine security forces are incessant in acquiring and developing their external defense capabilities. The PAF and PN big-ticket items in its respective pipelines are complemented by the PA's readiness to shift to territorial defense as its fight against insurgency nears an end after more than 50 years.

STRIKING THE BALANCE

As benefits from the mutual defense treaty with the US remain uncertain while also being a recipient of the benefits of its economic partnership with China, striking a balance between these has now become an item of clear importance for the Philippines in the global stage. While it looks like a tug-of-war where the country has to pick a single side, Manila needs to strike a balance between these two superpowers. While the US continues to pursue validation of the mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, China seeks to establish itself as the Asia's big brother and a reliable economic partner to its Asian neighbors. A wager on Chinese goodwill may be perceived as

Perplexed Security Under VUCADD Environment



advantageous for the Philippines to increase its economic activities, thus bringing financial gains that will significantly aid the Philippines' self-defense capability build-up. On the other hand, the partnership with the US as an ally must be sustained to ensure security and stability in the Southeast Asia region.

While the Philippines must keep a balance between these two powerhouses, an inevitable repositioning to pivot to the New World Order must be well-thought-out. Furthermore, it is important to consider the Philippines' reaffirmation of its commitment to the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and its crucial role in peace, stability, and prosperity in the East Asia region.

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: A WAY AHEAD FOR THE PH AND ITS MDT WITH THE US

At this point, the author of this article shall propose a framework for analysis of the Philippines' way ahead in renewing a more robust and detailed Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. As a way ahead, the writer proposes a Framework for the Philippines' pivot to the New World Order.

It can be deduced that the Defense, Security, and Foreign Policy has to continue to strike a balance between the super powers, US and China.

The Philippines needs to review its benefits and position in the Mutual Defense Treaty. Moving forward with its progress and development, alignment of security and independent foreign policy must conform to its national interest and thus not posture us in an imbalance perplexed security situation.

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Breaking the Barriers: Developing a Responsive Training Management across Domains

by MAJ MARIA LOURDES E RANARIO (RES)

The Philippine Army operates in a highly changing environment that demands proper manning, equipping, organization, and sustainment to yield successful operations. These key functions work together to create and maintain effective organizations with training, in view that effectiveness is often gauged through performance gained through training, binding all of these functions together. In this, training proves to be a significant organizational capability that requires periodic assessment and corresponding enhancement. Such is necessary to ensure that performance outputs are responsive, manifested by both individual and unitary attainment of objectives. Military training is undergone for the accomplishment of tasks associated with the military mission (Kime & Anderson, 1997), therefore meriting the tedious process that encompasses sound training management.

Based on the Philippine Army Education and Training Manual (PAM 8-00), the education and training management employs a systems approach that guides implementers and managers in effectively and efficiently supervising the various PA education and training programs, activities, and projects (PAM 8-00, 2014). The training management process applies the analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate (ADDIE) model to produce coherent, cohesive, and responsive outputs. This systems approach is carried out at the individual project level in order to implement training products.

THE CHALLENGES OF THE ADDIE AS A SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR TRAINING MANAGEMENT

As an approach originally crafted for the US Army, its original goal was to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of education and training by aligning instructions to the jobs that personnel are expected to perform. As such, the process has yielded increased instruction effectiveness, improved delivery-time efficiency, and produced the best instruction for the

lowest possible cost provided that conditions are favorable (Allen, 2006).

This paper recognizes the approach as a continuous cycle that necessitates completion of one phase prior to proceeding to the next, as the arrows suggest. As separate components, each of these phases has certain deliverables which requires a specialized set of competencies to be completed. However, challenges in establishing continuity are observed, as manifested in the broken-lined arrows. Still, while there are prevailing gaps, there are mechanisms that help progress the systems to come up with a sound training management. In presenting these stop gap measures, the paper also presents solutions and ways ahead to address and prepare a training management that is responsive to multi-domain operations.

In examining the specific components of this training management system, the **analyze phase** requires the examination of jobs and tasks that yield behavior, conditions, and standards for task performances. A needs analysis is then done to determine if training is needed (Allen, 2006) to address the performance gaps identified in each job requirement. This training needs analysis ultimately contributes to the overall training and educational strategy for the organization's staff. (Gould, et.al., 2004) On the other hand, the absence of an approved job performance task list for the Army, which should have been the basis for developing programs needed by the Army's individual personnel, presents another challenge. This circumstance has resulted in redundant training sessions and unwittingly takes on target competencies that are not aligned with organizational needs.

The **next phase is designing** the training strategy, translated in a Training Management Package (TMP) concept, whose objectives, content, and overall plan




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

addresses the needs of the students. (PAM 8-00, 2017) In this phase, what the students should be able to do after instruction, the conditions under which they may perform, and the acceptable standard of performance is defined. (Dick et al., 2005; Molenda et al., 1996) This phase requires logical and creative thinking to establish a learning process that each Army soldier can absorb and comprehend. However, objectives alone are difficult to craft with the understanding that these have to be S.M.A.R.T. – specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time-bound. Thus, proper training on the crafting of objectives is necessary and conducted in view that each Army personnel has the responsibility to educate each other, whether through formal or informal ways. More often than not, as observed in existing training designs, objectives do not meet one or more of these criteria, which makes the other processes of the ADDIE more difficult to conduct. Similarly, as design considers timelines in regard to deliverables, several factors also come into view that have to be taken into consideration.

For one, given the premise of a highly evolving environment, training management must ensure that designs are relevant to the current scenario. In some way, the design should ensure the program's flexibility in adapting to, and better suit, the organization's current needs. Apart from the seemingly unpredictable environment, training has to move along with rapid changes in terms of knowledge, technology, and academic assignments. (Ganesh & Indradevi, 2015)

Upon determination that training plans are aligned with organizational needs, the **development phase**

is initiated to provide the contents of the TMP. This is one of the more critical stages as this is where the learning products - the training materials and assessment materials - are developed to address the performance gap. (Welty, 2007) The purpose of this phase is to generate the lesson plans and materials necessary for instruction, including all media and supporting documentation. Thus, where the first two phases are all about planning and brainstorming, development is all about putting things into action. In this view, the tedious need to check the alignment of objectives and lesson content is mandatory.

Though misconstrued as the simply delivery of the TMP, the implementation stage reflects the continuous modification of the program to make sure maximum efficiency and positive results are obtained. On the other hand, this phase requires actions to re-design, update, and edit the course in order to ensure that it can be delivered effectively. (Kurt, 2018) It should be understood that in this process, instructors and learners are expected to actively contribute toward instantaneous modifications that can be made, thus making the program more effective and successful.

The last stage of the ADDIE method is evaluation, where the projects are subjected to meticulous final testing vis-à-vis how they met their objectives. Further, the program is evaluated to determine other requirements that would improve its efficiency and success rate. Evaluation is an essential step for the whole ADDIE method as it aims to determine the factors or criteria that affect the effectiveness of a project. In all of these, it is important to note that all the phases of the ADDIE require appropriate evaluation




Figure 2. ADDIE in an evaluative perspective (Basu, 2018)

(Figure 2) as in the perspective of Basu (2018). This view of the ADDIE process connotes a non-linear and dynamic relationship among the phases of the process.

In all of these, it must be understood that the training management system is not an independent system as it may be highly affected by cost breakdowns and estimated timelines, among others. Especially in consideration of resources, specifically time, higher mechanisms tend to work beyond the control of the system. These include higher management, planning and budgeting systems, and government appropriations that are part of each of the phases in training management. While this is not to surmise that these mechanisms dictate upon training management, they are but critical aspects that would ensure that the training management system, based on its defined breadth and scope, functions as it should.

TRAINING MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES IN A MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In the emergence of hybrid threats and the expansion of the Army's scope of performance as an organization, the training management system is expected to react to a wide range of potential missions— given the multi-dimensional environment. Having established the importance of training in the performance of units, training management must be able to prepare forces in peacetime and high-intensity conflict across all domains. At the same time, the Army must keep additional forces prepared, thus necessitating a major change in the Army's programs for training units.

With the vision that the training management program will evolve with the nature of operations and the need to deploy personnel with highly specialized

the system would need to fully understand the key processes and role players it would manage. The challenge, therefore, is in determining the methods of adaptation; how to support these changing needs would depend on the operational domain which would definitely dictate varied requirements. Further, the emergence of technologies and the realization that other modes of instruction are possible imply that the use of multiple means and technologies to deliver training and learning should be maximized whenever and wherever needed.

It is with no doubt that the Army is now entering an era in which it must be prepared to face a far wider range of possible missions and mission conditions. As a consequence, education and training activities are expected to expand, further necessitating changes in the training strategies. This would therefore require resources to support new scenarios that, likewise, need to be changed considerably. A whole new balance of critical tasks, skills, and conditions will definitely involve difficult decisions, especially where resources are concerned.

OVERCOMING CHALLENGES BY ENSURING RESPONSIVE TRAINING


To go beyond stop gap measures, changes in major policies have to be implemented to advocate the established processes in creating a sound environment for training programs – beginning with the standardization of the groundwork for such.

In view that materiel capabilities necessitate competencies for proper utilization, operation, and maintenance, appropriate training is likewise required. On the other hand, there are existing trainings that are dedicated to our current capabilities; therefore there is a need to ensure that trainings are not repetitive but complements each other.

As such, the ADDIE process was operationalized through Standard Operating Procedure Number 06, Curriculum Development Process, dated 27 May 2022, recognizing that the curriculum development process is an integral part of the organization's capacity to perform.

Guided by the very same principles that govern training management, the analysis phase begins with a performance analysis: where the performance

problem is identified based on the performance standards vis-à-vis the actual performance. If such gaps exist, then a performance problem is identified. However, it is to be understood that not all performance problems are attributed to a lack of training. As such, there is a need to prove correlation between deficiencies in performance with a lack of training as its foremost reason (i.e. following the DOTMPLF framework, ensuring that appropriate doctrines and organization – including projected personnel placements – are in place). This also ensures, and likewise assumes, that: (1) training will be based on approved local doctrines; (2) competencies for the training have been identified based on the requirements of the positions they are projected to hold and; (3) trained people will be performing functions where they can fully use their training.



If the performance deficiency is proven to be due to other causes, a non-training alternative may be recommended. However, if a training solution is recommended, a training analysis is conducted to further examine the recommendation. To further align training with organizational needs, a training needs and job analysis is done. The end products of the training analysis are competencies that the organization needs aligned with its objective to attain its mission, vision, and goals. The standards for job performance are based on the general expectations of a worker's responsibilities. This analysis then yields whether or not training is necessary to meet the required skill sets as a job requirement for a position or training objective.

In the design phase, the curriculum development teams systematically develop the training program. From the list of competencies identified in the analysis phase, the required knowledge, skills, and attitudes are defined. Competencies generated during the analysis phase are grouped together according to how they relate to one other. This part of the process is significant, as such groupings will be used to determine general objectives, program description, as well as possible topics or themes, as is the case for new programs. For existing programs, appropriateness of subject sequence is determined to identify possible requisites and potentially misplaced subjects. To ensure that the course, module, and subject objectives follow a proper hierarchy, curriculum developers are guided by Bloom's Taxonomy (Fig. 3)

The development phase builds on the outputs of the previous two phases and plans other considerations such as appropriate strategies, instructional materials, and learning assessment. Guided by the task verbs, this phase ensures that objectives delimit lower-order skills and that the parameters of each lesson is set in terms of skill and level and are phrased using the learner's point of view. Culling from this, curriculum developers identify strategies and approaches that will guide instructors on their lesson delivery. Consequently, these strategies should also be aligned with the assessment modes on how the achievement of lesson objectives are gauged. As the next stage is implementation, the Training Management Package (TMP) should be complete at this point. The TMP is the primary requirement for training approval that would propel its implementation. It is thus composed of the following:

- a) Program of Instruction (POI) – describes the whole content of the training, specifically its modules (if applicable), subjects and their corresponding objectives, delivery methods or instructional strategies, class requirements, and assessment.
- b) Master Training Schedule – shows the daily training of activities that composes the prescribed number of hours and/or training periods.
- c) Instructional Package – documents that guide the instructor in their delivery of classroom and/or field instructions. This contains the lesson plans (per subject), safety plan, handouts (as specified in the lesson plans), instructional media material (print-out of visual aids, as described in the lesson plan), and assessment instruments (i.e., written assessments and rubrics if performance outputs will be graded; per subject/ as applicable).




Figure 3. Bloom's Taxonomy and Corresponding Sample Verbs (Armstrong, 2010)

d) Learning Enhancement Package – this are the concept plans of activities that are off-POI such as on-the-job-training, staff/academic tours, and/ or FTX/ CPX.

e) Training Support Requirements – this includes the list of all the requirements necessary in the implementation of the training, such as facilities, materials, and equipment. In addition, the program of expenditure for the duration of the course, as well as the training directorate, is found in this section of the TMP.

f) Assessment Plan – this is where assessment instruments and schedules necessary for the completion of the course are found. This includes, but is not limited to, modules and final examinations and other major course graded requirements.

Standard Operating Procedure Number 06 also provides that members of the PA principal staff are to organize a Headquarters PA Technical Working Group, headed by the proponent/ end-user of the curriculum with Subject Matter Expert members from concerned units, offices, or schools who can contribute to the desired objectives of the training to be developed or revised. On the other hand, PA schools will also organize their Curriculum Development Teams who will accomplish the training development requirements. To further ensure the reliability of the outputs submitted and validity of the processes, the TRADOC, PA is charged with its certification prior to recommending the training implementation to the concerned approving authority.

CONCLUSION

To ensure a workable training management system, its components need to be examined closely to determine system gaps. Based on this analysis, training development, per se, has been plagued with standardization challenges that need to be addressed through the use of the very same framework for the training management system. These specific phases in the process have their respective objectives towards ensuring effective training delivery as part of the training management system.

Primarily, the training is governed by the ADDIE framework that likewise guides its components. The framework, as discussed, initially determines whether any given problem falls under the purview of training. As such, this already delimits concerns processes by the training management system. While seemingly tedious, the phases allow for a base and common understanding on when and how to determine, and ultimately address, training-related concerns. Improving the system by improving its components requires an accurate understanding of existing major activities to establish a starting point from which changes can be initiated.

As the unit CDTs are actually part of identifying their training needs and establishing solutions for such, it likewise develops an understanding of the unit's weakness that can also be addressed by assessing leadership competencies and performance. As critical competency areas are identified, so too must other organizational aspects evolve, along with training.

New and changed requirements, such as those generated by new equipment, organizations, concepts, or operational requirements, must also be considered. In this regard, it is necessary to understand the end-users' and training implementer's changing operational needs to effectively prioritize training management goals and objectives. In this sense, aligning training with the evolution of the security domains will involve broadly defining and sufficiently specifying how activities should be reshaped and how resources should be reallocated. Provided that the training system appropriately prepares the foundations prior to training implementation and sets a process for continued assessment and revision – one that is iterative rather than linear.

Essentially, sound curriculum development is indicative of a responsive training management system. However, the responsibility of improving training components should be shared amongst end-users, implementers, and developers. Thus, TWGs and CDTs should be able to provide data and outputs to support training development towards a responsive training management system.

The evolving security environment demands specialized competencies that should be ready when needed. As the non-traditional roles of the Army expand, so must our competencies; and as competencies are built from training, the system should have fully oiled and fueled components to make it run.

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Strategic Leadership Lessons from the movie “Thirteen Days”

by COL SERGIO P MACARANDAN JR PA (MNSA)

The movie is a dramatization of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis that lasted for thirteen days from the 15th to the 28th of October, 1962. At the time, photos taken by U-2 spy planes revealed that the Soviet Union was in the process of building up conventional weapons in Cuba with the introduction of surface-to-surface medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). The official estimate was that the missile system was the SS-4 Sandal, which can deliver a three-megaton nuclear weapon up to a thousand miles. The surveillance mission also identified 32 missiles serviced by around 3,400 Soviet personnel. Positioned just 90 miles from the American mainland, those nuclear weapons were capable of wiping out American cities and military installations in the southeast and as far north as Washington, D.C. In the event of a launch, the US would only have five minutes of warning. In those five minutes, the Soviet could kill around 80 million Americans and destroy a significant percentage of US bomber bases.

The film chronicles the series of events that brought humanity closest to the brink of nuclear war than at any point in history. It focuses on the decision-making process of then President John F Kennedy and his advisers as they struggle with uncertainties and the fear of a nuclear war, should they fail to choose the right option amongst conflicting recommendations.

This paper will create a “faction map” describing how each faction in the movie defined the challenge. It will also identify the highest, or most noble, value of each faction and describe how each faction framed the issue. Additionally, this paper will characterize the loyalties of each faction and identify the potential or perceived losses each faction fears. This will also describe two effective acts of leadership and two failed attempts while identifying what made for effectiveness or failure in each case. Subsequently, this will describe how President Kennedy’s authority was both a resource and a constraint. Lastly, this paper will connect the adaptive leadership present in the Cuban Missile Crisis with current world events.

THE ADAPTIVE CHALLENGE

An adaptive challenge is a situation where there are no clear solutions to the problem or instances where there are too many answers but no clear options (Ng, 2016). It is adaptive which means it is unpredictable, uncertain, and confusing.

The adaptive challenge in the Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC) as dramatized in the movie is the correct US response to the Soviet Union’s placement of missiles in Cuba, in a way that it will not trigger the risk of a nuclear war.

STAKEHOLDERS

A stakeholder is an individual, group or organization that is affected by the results of an undertaking, is interested in its success, and can be inside or outside the organization (ProgramManager, 2021). Stakeholders can either have a positive or negative impact on the project.

When President John F Kennedy learned of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, he formed an ad hoc committee, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), composed of senior administration officials to give him advice (Lindsay, 2012). President Kennedy and his advisers were struggling to find good solutions to address the crisis. Below is the list of stakeholders who are affected by the adaptive challenge:

- 1) President John F Kennedy;
- 2) ExComm Members:
 - Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson
 - Dean Rusk – Secretary of State
 - Robert McNamara – Secretary of Defense
 - C. Douglas Dillon – Secretary of the Treasury
 - Robert Kennedy – Attorney General
 - John McCone – Central Intelligence Agency Director
 - George W. Ball – Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs
 - Roswell Gilpatric – Deputy Secretary of Defense

ADAPTIVE CHALLENGE STAKEHOLDER MAP

	STAKEHOLDERS	ADAPTIVE CHALLENGE	VALUES	LOYALTIES	LOSSES	DEFINITION OF THE CHALLENGE	FRAMING OF THE ISSUE
Quarantine on Cuba	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pres. John F. Kennedy 2. Special Asst. to the President, Kenneth O'Donnell 3. Attorney General Robert Kennedy 4. State Secretary Dean Rusk- initially favored air strike 5. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara 6. Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon- initially favored air strike 7. Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric 8. Ambassador -at-Large Llewellyn Thompson 9. Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen 	<p>Correct response to Soviet missiles placement in Cuba</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Highly value human life. 2. Non-use of nuclear weapon. 3. Sense of moral superiority. 4. Democracy. 5. Alliances. 6. Standing in the global community. 7. Political authority is derived from the people. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Act responsibly to maintain international status. 2. Maintain image as a moral actor. 3. Shun action that requires excessive use of force. 4. Follow rules of engagement in conflict. 5. Defend allies. 6. Avoid anything that results in heavy casualties. 7. Answerable to its citizens. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Security 2. Competence 3. Identity 4. Power 5. Time 	<p>Adaptive Challenge</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Use of force could trigger an all-out nuclear war. 2. Forcible action could provoke the Soviets to seize West Berlin. 3. Nuclear war would bring mutually assured destruction (MAD). 4. In nuclear war, none of them will live enough to tell them that they were wrong.
Air Strike and Subsequent Invasion	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2. Former State Secretary Dean Acheson 3. CIA Director John McCone 4. Special Assistant to the President for NSA McGeorge Bundy 		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dominance and National Security. 2. Role as a super power. 3. Technology. 4. Fight quickly and easily. 5. Importation or imposition of their values to other nations. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Intolerance to foreign meddling. 2. Views conflict as a crusade to combat evil. 3. Dedicates all resources to conflict 4. Heavily reliant on technology. 5. Willing to take more risks and feels assured that this will 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lives 2. Reputation 3. Righteousness 4. Resources 5. Status 	<p>Technical Challenge</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Quarantine is a weak response. 2. Soviet missiles could wipe out American cities and military installations. 3. Soviets could kill around 80 million Americans. 4. Understands that the use of force

				work in their favor.			was their only option. 5.Soviets understand only one language – action; respects only one word – action. 6. Safety threat of nuclear deterrent. 7.Threat to U.S. strategic superiority. 8.The crisis offers Soviets nuclear first-strike capability. 9.Duty and responsibility to the American people to take Soviet missiles down.
Firmness but not for the Use of Force	American People		1. Highly values human life. 2.Transparency and openness. 3. Sense of optimism.		1. Comfort 2. Control 3. Time	Adaptive Challenge	1. Armed intervention is unpopular. 2. Quarantine is firmness.
Shut out of the Decision Making	Western European Allies		1. Highly values human life. 2. National security. 3. Democracy. 4. Alliances.	1. Defend allies. 2. Shun action that requires excessive use of force. 3. Follow rules of engagement in conflict. 4. Avoidance of anything that requires heavy casualties. 5. Answerable to its citizens.	1. Lives 2. Status 3.Reputation 4. Control 5. Time	Adaptive Challenge	1. U.S. was slightly demented in seeing Cuba as a serious threat. 2. Air attack is a mad act.

- General Maxwell D. Taylor – Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Llewellyn Thompson – Ambassador-at-Large
- Theodore Sorensen – Special Counsel
- McGeorge Bundy – National Security Adviser

- 3) Other Experts Inside and Outside the Government;
- Kenneth O'Donnell – Advisor to the President
- Adlai Stevenson – UN Ambassador
- Dean Acheson – Former Secretary of State

- Pierre Salinger – White House Press Secretary
- General Earle Wheeler – Army Chief
- General Curtis LeMay – Air Force Chief
- Admiral George Anderson – Naval Operations Chief
- General David Shoup – Marine Corps Commandant
- Paul Nitze – International Security Assistant Secretary
- Edwin Martin – Inter-American Affairs Assistant Secretary
- Donald Wilson – Information Agency deputy Director
- Walt W. Rostow – Policy Planner
- U. Alexis Johnson – Political Affairs Under Secretary
- Bromley K. Smith – Executive Secretary, National Security Council

- 4) The American People;
- 5) Organization of American States (OAS);
- 6) Italy;
- 7) Turkey;
- 8) NATO;
- 9) Soviet Union;
- 10) Cuba; and
- 11) The Warsaw Pact.

EFFECTIVE ACTS OF LEADERSHIP AND WHAT MADE FOR THEIR EFFECTIVENESS

The first effective act of leadership demonstrated by President Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was when, upon knowing about the Soviet build-up of offensive weapons in Cuba, he assembled a small group of elite advisers, the ExComm, to give him advice on how to address the crisis.

President Kennedy's most useful trait as a leader was with the subtler aspect of his personality – he was a realist who was able to delegate authority (Ghaemi, 2012). His being a realist from time to time rested with his perception of things beyond his control, and how to “give the work back to the group” by yielding a certain amount of authority (Heifetz, 1994). President Kennedy's forming of the ExComm demonstrates delegation of authority as he knew his limitations; however, the final decision as to the crisis still rested with him. Delegating lightens workload, builds trust and empowers each team member. His absence from a number of committee meetings allowed free exchange of ideas among its members and facilitated the unfolding of events beyond his cognizance. It created a productive exchange of ideas that led to the resolution of the crisis.

What made him effective was his transparency and

ability to influence others to influence others. He was transparent with his goals and the challenges being confronted by articulating his intention at the onset – which was to get rid of the missiles in Cuba while preventing the escalation of conflict into an all-out nuclear war. It expedited committee members' understanding of their role in the crisis and how they could contribute in the attainment of their goals and objectives. Though committee members had diverging points of view, their sense of value and purpose enabled them to heighten their level of engagement. President Kennedy's ability to influence others also contributed to the effectiveness of his act of leadership. He actively listened to the views of the ExComm members and emphasized that their deliberations must lead to building a consensus among the three options presented in response to the threat: air strike, invasion, and blockade of Cuba. After many discussions, the ExComm reached a consensus towards a naval blockade (termed a quarantine). President Kennedy finally opted for a quarantine while keeping the air strike as an option, depending on the developments.

The **second effective act of leadership** demonstrated by President Kennedy was when he rejected calls from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an air strike against Soviet missile sites, followed by an invasion of Cuba and the removal of Fidel Castro. This act shows an application of one of Heifetz' concepts in his theory of adaptive leadership – “managing the disequilibrium.” This phrase aptly captures the notion of history as a series of disturbances and counter-disturbances (Chace, 2015). Tragedies in history happen when disequilibrium is not properly managed. President Kennedy was well aware of the consequences, should military response be undertaken. He was mindful that an air strike, and its succeeding invasion, would trigger Soviet military response and put the world on the brink of a nuclear war. President Kennedy wanted everyone to slow down, think of the problem before them, and see the bigger picture. He and his advisors were cognizant of the significance of managing the disequilibrium to prevent an all-out nuclear war.

What made this act effective was President Kennedy's capacity to understand the problems of others; he sought to see things through the Soviet Union's First Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev's, eyes. He wanted to know why the Soviets placed missiles in Cuba, what were their real interests, and the major reasons for their actions. Through these, President Kennedy was able to understand how threatening the world seemed to the Kremlin (Holiday, 2019).

This understanding helped him appropriately respond to Soviet provocation and offered him discernment on how the Soviets would respond to his actions. Thinking through other uncertainties, such as the number of soldiers who would perish in an invasion, the world's response to an incursion on a smaller country, and Soviet's responses to save face or protect its soldiers on the island, led President Kennedy to take the option of a naval quarantine on Cuba (Chace, 2015).

FAILED ATTEMPTS AND WHAT MADE FOR THEIR FAILURE

The **first failed act of leadership** was President Kennedy's failure to consult with the Western European Allies about the Cuban Missile Crisis where they both faced nuclear annihilation. He failed to appreciate the value and wisdom of allied leaders who could have offered him advice in such serious crisis. His act contradicted the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty that pledges signatories to consult one another whenever territorial integrity, political independence, or any of their security is threatened (Costigliola, 1995). The Kennedy administration explained that it was done to maintain secrecy and prevent the conflict from spreading into Europe; it appeared that American leaders had prejudices that made it easy for them to decide on questions of life and death without the participation of the Allies. This failed act of leadership caused European resentment and helped explain why Western Europe's relations with Washington cooled during the Kennedy presidency despite JFK's popularity among Western Europeans.

What made for this failure was American leaders' lack of trust in the Allies. Costigliola (1995) asserts that the officials behind the Kennedy administration consider Western Europeans as unequal, shaky, inexperienced, and impractical and "emotional" others of the NATO family. American leaders view the Allies as partners who are ready to compromise with the Soviets but not with Washington officials – for them, the Allies need to be manipulated rather than consulted. However, this failure cannot solely be attributed to American attitude towards Western Europeans. The Allies are still weak compared to the U.S. as they are neither certain nor united on political and strategic issues. Should the Allies unite, Washington made a promise to treat them as an equal partner. The U.S. wants a united Western Europe to help contain the Soviets and create a larger market for U.S. businesses, generate resources

that Washington is able to tap to combat communism and poverty in Third World countries (Costigliola, 1995).

The **second failed act of leadership** was the President's loose control of the Pentagon brass. There were many instances where the military generals showed arrogance and disrespect to their Commander-in-Chief. During the early days of the crisis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were insistent on the use of force as a response to the Soviets. In one of the meetings, Air Force Chief General Curtis LeMay was forceful in opposing options short of direct military action. He even dismissed President Kennedy's apprehension that the Soviets would respond to an attack on their Cuban missiles by seizing West Berlin (Dallek, 2013). He argued that bombing the missiles would deter the Soviets, while keeping them intact would embolden them to seize Berlin. He disputed that a blockade and political action would only lead the U.S. right into war. He also proclaimed that not acting was as bad as appeasement in Munich, even adding that the president was in a "pretty bad fix" at the time. President Kennedy took offense at that statement and only hid his anger with a laugh and responded to General LeMay: "You're in it the with me." Another instance was when Strategic Air Command (SAC) Commander ordered placing readiness condition at DEFCON 2 in defiance of the president's order to remain at DEFCON 3.

What made this a failure were the strains between President Kennedy and his military generals from the very start of his presidency. He feared that the military's top brass would overreact to Soviet provocations and bring the country to a disastrous nuclear conflict (Dallek, 2013). The Joint Chiefs of Staff also felt that President Kennedy would not measure up to his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower. They sensed that the president did not sufficiently understand the challenges before him. On the other hand, the president already had a bad experience with the military generals for trusting them in the botched Bay of Pigs invasion which, they said, was well-planned and capable of success. He already learned his lesson not to trust the military or to, at the least, be doubtful of their advice and consult other advisors who may have a more detached view.

KENNEDY'S AUTHORITY AS A RESOURCE AND A CONSTRAINT

President Kennedy's authority was both a resource and a constraint. On the one hand, it was a resource

because it provided the structure from which he convened a group of advisors, the ExComm, to deliberate and provide him advice on the Soviet missile threat. Gathering all experts in one place allowed them to communicate, exchange ideas, and coordinate efforts towards a common goal. Though ExComm members had disparate views about the crisis, their various deliberations facilitated a freer range of thinking – as opposed to the deliberations preceding the botched Bay of Pigs invasion where groupthink was pervasive (Chace, 2015). His authority also established a clear chain of command from top to bottom. It created unity of command, reduced confusion and established accountability. Even if his military generals were opposed to his views, President Kennedy was able to assert his authority—this can be seen in one of the scenes in the movie where he berated General Maxwell Taylor when the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was placed at DEFCON 2, counter to his order for DEFCON 3. President Kennedy emphasized to General Taylor that he had the authority as the Commander-in-Chief and had the say when they would go to war.

On the other hand, President Kennedy's authority was a constraint because his policy choices would now be dependent on satisfying the preferences of his constituents and avoid policies that would provoke political opposition, or were unlikely to receive support from key domestic actors (Keller, 2005). Goldminz (2017) asserts that authority is contingent on meeting the expectations of constituencies and that drifting from these expectations is dangerous. In the movie, President Kennedy was opposed to military response as it could risk an escalation of conflict, trigger Soviet seizure of West Berlin, and push the world to the brink of a nuclear war. The president was wary of evoking fears of nuclear destruction among the American people and figured that opting for a more forceful alternative would generate sharp public criticism. To give context, the domestic political situation at that time revealed that the use of force was highly unpopular among the general public and interest groups. Furthermore, recent disclosures of declassified materials revealed that in early October 1962, President Kennedy was aware of a Michigan poll showing that a majority of respondents were in favor of a blockade on Cuba and that data from comparable polls at that time indicated public support for "firmness," but not for the use of force (McKeown, 2000).

ADAPTIVE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS VIS-À-VIS SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE

Adaptive challenges are problems where there are no clear solutions nor trained experts to solve the problems at hand. Unlike technical challenges where there are existing and pre-determined responses and can be solved by experts or professionals, adaptive challenges are difficult because there are no rules or procedures that exist to solve them. Solving them demands leaders to give up things they value most: habits, loyalties, and ways of thinking (Heifetz & Linsky, 2002).

In the movie *Thirteen Days*, the Cuban Missile Crisis presents an adaptive challenge on what possible response/s the United States would take to address the Soviet missile threat. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended an air strike and a subsequent invasion of Cuba. President Kennedy rejected the call for an airstrike as it might trigger reprisals against NATO missiles in Turkey and Italy or the seizure of West Berlin by the Soviets. President Kennedy opted for the quarantine of Cuba. However, the JCS opposed this quarantine as they perceived it as a weak response, with the U.S. losing the strategic surprise and running the risk of the Soviet launching the first strike against them. Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, argued that with either air strike or quarantine, the U.S. would undertake the risk of nuclear war. He instead proposed to strike a deal with the Soviets by trading the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey with the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba and employ a back channel through the United Nations. Then again, doing nothing would undermine U.S. alliances and could embolden the Soviet to seize West Berlin.

The various factions identified in the Cuban Missile Crisis have different ways of framing the problem. For the JCS, as pointed out by Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson in one of the ExComm meetings with President Kennedy, the "Soviets understand only one language – "action," and respects only one word – "force." And as explained by Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis Lemay to President Kennedy in another meeting, an air strike was the only course of action as America was in danger. General Lemay further stressed that the Soviet missiles were a threat to the U.S. bomber bases and the safety of their nuclear deterrent. He then emphasized that it was

their duty and responsibility to the American people to take those missiles out and return stability to the strategic situation.

These different views about the crisis at hand demonstrate that the problem is inherently adaptive and that there are no clear solutions to it. The initial impulses of the JCS to respond with a military force over Soviet missiles on Cuba is a technical thinking which views the issue as a technical challenge that requires technical response. Whereas President Kennedy did not immediately leap into action and resisted the pressure to do something. He first took time to diagnose the problem by observing the events around him, interpreting them, and planning for courses of action based on his observations and interpretation. This process is called “diagnosing the system” in Heifetz’ theory of adaptive leadership.

Correlating the adaptive challenge present in the Cuban Missile Crisis with current world events, the South China Sea (SCS) Dispute offers a case where the problem is unclear with no clear solutions. The SCS is subject to overlapping maritime claims by the Philippines, China, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. As such, it is rife with disputes concerning sovereignty and sovereign rights over its islands and other maritime features. Muddled by several factors such as the economic and geostrategic importance of the area and the presence of various claimants, the SCS dispute has dragged on for decades. To manage tensions arising from these overlapping maritime claims, the ASEAN and China have been negotiating for a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea since 1992. As basis for a COC that was to follow, the ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002. The DOC is a non-binding declaration where signatories plainly swore to settle their disputes peacefully and exercise self-restraint to prevent conflicts that would affect peace and stability in the region. Eighteen years on, the DOC still has not been fully nor effectively implemented and has mostly been ignored by claimant states, particularly China. On 6 August 2017, the framework for the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea was endorsed by the foreign ministers of ASEAN and China, with the framework reviewed in Manila. It went through the first reading process in July 2019. The regional bloc adopted a three-year timeline to finally conclude the COC by 2022, as proposed by China during the 22nd ASEAN-China Summit held in Bangkok, Thailand on 3 November 2019.

ASEAN senior officials had once again expressed hope for an early conclusion of a COC that is effective, substantive, and consistent with the UNCLOS during the 37th ASEAN Summit held in Jakarta, Indonesia on 12 November 2020.

However, the ASEAN and China have diverging views about issue. The ASEAN hopes for a COC that is legally binding, consistent with international law, and is recognized by the international community. Outside countries like the US, Australia, Japan, India, New Zealand, and the European Union have also called for a legally binding COC that is not a product of “coercive unilateral actions.” In contrast, China asserts that a COC could be a non-binding instrument that promotes regional trust and prefers one with “regional characteristics.” It also does not want outside forces seeking to interfere in the dispute. The challenge in crafting a final and effective COC is in how to reconcile these differences

The negotiations for the COC present an adaptive challenge where the differences among claimant countries are difficult to reconcile with the application of current technical know-how or routine behavior. The adaptive challenge in this dispute requires adaptive work consisting of the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to diminish the gap between the people’s values and the reality they confront (Goldminz, 2017). To make better progress in the negotiations, their leaders have to prepare themselves to face a set of deeper issues and accept solutions that require a changing of values, loyalties, and ways of thinking.

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Integrating Environmental Peacebuilding in the Civil Military Operations (CMO) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

by **COMMO ROY VINCENT T TRINIDAD PN**
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INTRODUCTION

“Many conflicts are triggered, exacerbated or prolonged by competition over scarce natural resources; climate change will only make the situation worse.

That is why protecting our environment is critical to the founding goals of the United Nations to prevent war and sustain peace.”

— *UN Secretary-General António Guterres*

The environment is defined as the sum total of all the living and non-living elements and their effects that influence human life (Byju, n.d.). The living or biotic elements include but is not limited to the plants (flora), animals (fauna), forests, fisheries, birds, microorganisms; while non-living or abiotic elements include the air, water, land, sunlight, soil, rocks, among others (Byju, n.d.).

The United Nations’ Handbook of National Accounting: Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting defined the environment as “the totality of all the external conditions affecting the life, development and survival of an organism” (OECD, 2003). This shows also that the human beings depend on its naturally-produced physical surroundings for its everyday activities.

Putting these surroundings of an organism or human being into various uses with economic ends are called environmental functions (OECD, 2003). Some of the functions of the environment includes, but is not

limited to the following (Byju, n.d.): •

The environment provides the supply of resources which may be renewable and non-renewable resources. Renewable resources are those resources which are never depleted or exhausted with their continuous use while non-renewable resources are those that are exhausted or depleted with their continuous use. Examples of the renewable resources are solar energy, wind energy, hydropower and geothermal energy, while non-renewable resources include the fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, coal), mineral resources, and nuclear energy (from radioactive elements in mined mineral resources).

- The environment sustains life by providing genetic and biodiversity. The environment also includes those that are essential for human life such as sunlight, soil, water and air.

- The environment assimilates wastes that are generated in the production and consumption activities. The environment helps in getting rid of the garbage or wastes.

- The environment enhances the quality of life of human beings.

Environment Dimension of National Security. Buzan et. al. (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998) identified the Environmental Sector, together with Political, Economic, Socio-Cultural, Techno-Scientific and Military, as one of the key dimensions of national security.

In the environmental sector, there is a wide range of

range of items or objects that needs to be protected (referent objects) from existential threats. These may include, but not limited to, survival of a certain species (e.g., humans, Philippine eagles, tigers etc.), type of habitat (e.g., rain forest, lakes) or ecosystem or biosphere etc. The threats may be from humans themselves, the result of the activities of humans (e.g., pollution from manufacturing processes or mining activities), or natural disasters.

Natural Resources which are part of the environmental sector/dimension in national security has been identified as a source of power of nations or countries. However, these can also be sources of conflict. Such as the cases in Peru, Venezuela, and Sierra Leone where land, oil and diamonds, respectively, were the resources that were the sources of conflict.

Conflicts brought about by natural resources and the environment have contributed to challenges that the 21st century is facing, as these have posed existential threats to mankind's security in the local, national and international settings.

When the environment and natural resources are managed sustainably and in an equitable manner, these natural resources and environment can be an instrument for peace.

Recently, environmental peacebuilding has emerged as a new discipline in environment and natural resource management. It is a result of the understanding that though natural resources may bring conflict, environmental management and sustainable development of natural resources can be an area of coordination and cooperation resulting to peacebuilding.

Our country, the Philippines, is rich in natural resources, biodiversity and ecosystem. Natural resources are one of the power resources of a country. It can both be a country's critical asset for peacebuilding or a source of conflict. Natural resources such as, but not limited to, forests, water, minerals, land, fossil fuel, can contribute to conflict, fuel armed conflict, and be targeted by combatants. It can also facilitate post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. It is one of the foundations for rebuilding livelihoods and national economies since natural resources can provide jobs for the citizenry, among others.

Environmental Peacebuilding. Environment and

natural resources may have an impact on conflict and peace across the conflict lifecycle. The conflict lifecycle is the different stages in the existence of a conflict.

Armed conflict would usually start as social disputes over wealth, power, abuses, political marginalization, abuses or combinations of these. Mostly, there are efforts to expose and resolve conflicts before it becomes violent conflicts. However, once it has become a violent conflict or becomes armed conflicts, the focus of the stakeholders would be to end the conflict (**peacemaking**) (Bruch, 2019).

After the peace agreements are in place, international soldiers, police and civilians are invited to preserve the fragile peace (**peacekeeping**). The end of hostilities would then usher in the transition to the next stage, post-conflict **peacebuilding**. If the peacebuilding is successful, this would then lead to sustainable development in the said area (Bruch, 2019).




Figure 1. The Conflict Lifecycle [Source: (Bruch, 2019)]

Environment and natural resources present both threats or risks and opportunities at different stages of the conflict lifecycle. When stakeholders see that those in the government can be corrupted resulting to the unequitable allocation of natural resources, this may also be a strong cause of conflict. Extreme pollution and environmental degradation can also be a cause of conflict.

Also, the environment and natural resources cannot be spared from the risks during armed conflict. These are in the forms of financing conflict, environment as a weapon of war and being damaged by the conflict. Natural resources can provide funding for armed



Figure 2. Miners working one of the thousands of artisanal mines. [Source: (Baker, n.d.)]

groups. Any natural resource that can provide legal revenues can also be used by armed groups to finance armed conflict (Bruch, 2019). One of these natural resources are the so-called blood diamonds that have financed armed conflicts in Sierra Leone.

The environment can also be used as a weapon of war. In the Viet Nam War, the US troops, in their Operation Popeye, seeded clouds over North Viet Nam to extend the monsoon rains in Viet Nam in order to delay military advancement of the Viet Cong. The US made weather an instrument of war.

In the Gulf War in 1990-91, nearly 789 Kuwaiti oil wells were set on fire by Iraq (Naar, 2015; Bruch, 2019). They also opened the valves to an offshore oil terminal that created massive oil spill (Bruch, 2019).

During armed conflict, more serious environmental damages will result because of the breakdown of environmental governance and the short-term strategies that the people must adopt in order to survive. This may include deforestation (Bruch, 2019).



Figure 3. Operation Popeye was the codename for the American weather modification program whose purpose was to extend the monsoon season in Vietnam during the war.



Figure 4. US Marines walk across the charred oil landscape near a burning well during perimeter security patrol near Kuwait City on 07 March 1991. [Source: (Naar, 2015)].

After armed conflict, when peace agreements with armed terror groups have been signed, environmental damages may still result due to the failure of government to provide environmental governance and due to illegal activities of some rogue groups.

This happened in Colombia after the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (or FARC) had an agreement with Columbian national government that ended their fifty-year armed conflict. During the armed conflict, FARC controlled many parts of the protected areas (ecologically important lands such as forest areas for conservation) in Columbia. The presence of the FARC deterred resource extraction (or mining) and deforestation. So, during peace when the FARC have already dispersed, the rogue mining or illegal logging operators have resumed in the protected areas in Columbia. Cattle ranchers have resorted to illegal logging to clear areas for their cattle ranches (Aronson, 2020).



Figure 5. Deforestation surged following end of armed conflict in Colombia

Traditionally, environmental security has been focused on understanding the risks of natural resources and environment as the drivers of conflict. It should be noted, however, that there is also a need to understand the positive opportunities brought about by natural resources and the environment. This can be a step towards ending conflict, strengthening recovery, and building and sustaining peace.

Cognizant to the fact that environmental degradation and mismanagement of natural resources can be causes of conflict, improving environmental and natural resource governance and ensuring public participation of stakeholders can be the starting point for cooperation among the government and stakeholders. And this can usher moves for dialogue and economic incentives to end armed conflict. Further, natural resources and the environment can provide a good starting area for dialogue (communication), coordination and cooperation. This is important and an essential tool in ending conflict and sustaining peace.




Figure 6. Natural Resources and Environment Risks Across the Conflict Lifecycle [Source: (Bruch, 2019)].

Figure 6 shows the role of the environment and natural resources across the conflict lifecycle.

Civil Military Operations (CMO). Civil Military Operations (CMO) are the planned activities undertaken by the military. This can either be done independently or in coordination with civilian entities such as, but not limited to, civil government agencies (CGA), local government units (LGUs) and non-government organizations (NGOs), in support to the accomplishment of the mission of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to gain popular support and weaken the will of the enemy to fight (AFP, 2014). CMO is done to gain the hearts and minds of the people.

CMO may involve economic, psycho-political and psycho-social activities, and may be done before, during or following combat operations and/or natural or man-made disasters and calamities.

These CMO activities may range from the simple exemplary act of an individual soldier, to the use of a unit of AFP personnel and equipment for large-scale community improvement projects or initiatives that could help remove the root causes of insurgency and encourage/catalyze socio-economic development.

The primary objectives of CMO activities are to neutralize/destroy the threat groups' will to fight and gain popular support for the AFP, while its secondary objectives are to support the government's development activities, protecting the environment and helping the people prepare and cope with the hard realities of disasters and/or calamities.




Figure 7. CMO Model [(AFP, 2014)].

Figure 7 shows the CMO pillars and its program components and target audiences. The perimeter reflects the emphasis of each pillar on the efforts each has to contend with in the conduct of its activities.

The three CMO pillars are: **Public Affairs**, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations pillars. The Public Affairs pillar is the CMO pillar that conducts information-related activities directed to the external public to ensure a clear, accurate, and timely dissemination of information consistent with preserving security and privacy. It is likewise conducted to establish and maintain constructive relations with the communities to promote the organization's objectives. Public affairs activities are designed to gain the peoples' trust, support and confidence in the AFP (AFP, 2014).

The conduct of Public Affairs ranges from Public Information and Community Relations activities and programs. It makes the soldiers aware of the importance of the information environment and the community support affecting the conduct of military operations.

The **Civil Affairs** pillar is the pillar undertaken independent of or in coordination with civilian entities that promotes public trust through cooperation, collaboration and conduct of sociological and

developmental activities to gain popular support.

It embraces activities designed to win the hearts and minds of the people; gain their willing cooperation, support and confidence; and induce their active participation in the attainment of military objectives and national goals (AFP, 2014).

The conduct of Civil Affairs ranges from Civil Relations and Civic Action activities and programs. It makes the soldier and the AFP responsive to the needs of the society, which in turn leads the public to respond in a favorable way toward the AFP.

The **Psychological Operation** pillar is conducted to influence the beliefs, emotions, attitudes, opinions and ultimately the behavior of target audiences (enemy and its mass base and supporters) to redirect unfavorable attitudes and behavior into favorable, and to transform neutral or passive attitude and behavior to become favorable towards the accomplishment of the AFP mission (AFP, 2014).

The CMO pillars are **Public Affairs, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations**. Public Affairs, which include Public Information (PI) and Community Relations (COMREL), are AFP information activities for the external audience. Civil Affairs, composed of Civic Action (CIVAC) and Civil Relations (CIVREL), are

activities that have sociological and developmental effects on the external audience. Psychological Operations, on the other hand, are activities that influence the target audiences (enemy and key communicators) advantageous and contributory toward the accomplishment of the AFP mission. PsyOps' program components include Words PsyOps, Deeds PsyOps and Counter Propaganda.

Environment in Southern Philippines. Natural resources for use in the human activities is important in the Philippines. It is also of utmost importance for those in the underdeveloped regions of Mindanao. Ewing (2010) wrote that large portion of the Bangsamoro in Mindanao continue to rely directly upon natural resources for their livelihoods and sustenance. A large majority of the Bangsamoro are dependent on the traditional means of livelihood such as farming, fishing and low-volume trade. The population is heavily dependent on the availability and viability of local strategic resources (Ewing, 2010). Mindanao is rich in natural resources, may it be land, agriculture or in mineral resources. Competition of the colonial and Filipino actors seeking to profit from Mindanao's bountiful natural resources have consistently caused friction with the interests of the Bangsamoro over these strategic environmental resources (Ewing, 2010). The economic gains from the utilization of natural resources within Mindanao has benefitted the Christian migrant population, resulting to the economic marginalization of the Bangsamoro. These destitute conditions of the Bangsamoro have fueled their grievances and have intensified the conflict dynamics in Southern Philippines. Environmental degradation and climate change make matter worst.

Environmental Peacebuilding in Civil Military Operations. Environmental peacebuilding is an emerging field of research and practice that views environmental conflict or natural resources conflict as an opportunity to build peace. It advocates environmental protection and cooperation as a factor in creating more peaceful relations among communities and states. Environmental peacebuilding incorporates natural resource management and environmental protection into peacebuilding activities and strategies to support development and security for the present and future generations (ELI, n.d.).

Civic Action is the component of the CMO Civil Affairs pillar that conducts military-initiated activities with

developmental and sociological purposes in order to gain popular support and is characterized by activities that are generally community development oriented. It can range from the delivery of limited basic services to the implementation of major engineering projects. Activities under Civic Action may include, but is not limited to the following activities depending on the military objectives: medical and dental services, engineer capability assistance; humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) and environmental protection.

Cognizant to this, activities that support and ensure compliance to environmental laws, participation in community environment protection programs, reforestation projects, and assistance in anti-illegal logging campaigns can also be included in CMO.

Environmental Peacebuilding through CMO in Sulu. The coronavirus pandemic has also contributed to the difficulties in Southern Philippines including the war-ravaged villages in Sulu.

Recently, in partnership with the Bud Bunga Women's Association, a Tausug women's group, the AFP's 2nd Special Forces Battalion, initiated gardening activity envisioned to be the forerunner to the Bud Bunga Balik Barangay program (Abubakar-Jocson, 2021).

A private firm, East-West Seeds Corporation, donated seedlings while the soldiers installed a 4,000 liter water system and sanitation facility (Abubakar-Jocson, 2021).



Figure 8 GARDENING PROGRAM. Lt. Willy Sao-ao assists a Bud Bunga resident in developing a community garden in Talipao town in Sulu. [Source: (Abubakar-Jocson, 2021), photos from 2nd Special Forces Battalion FB page / MANILA BULLETIN]



Figure 10. The women residents of the Barangay Bud Bunga together with Officers and EUGENE

The Bud Bunga Balik Barangay program aims to encourage residents to return to their communities after escaping the conflict between soldiers and the terror group Abu Sayyaf. This would also help address the vulnerability of locals to be dragged into conflict in exchange for food, money and other sustenance. This program would ensure food and environmental security, contributing to peace in the area (Abubakar-Jocson, 2021).

According to BGEN EUGENE BOQUIO PA (MNSA), Bde Commander of the 1101 Inf Bde, the Bud Bunga Balik Barangay Program is part of the mass base operations and community support program of the 1101 Inf Bde and implemented by the 2nd SFBn led by its CO, LTC BENITO RAMOS JR PA (GSC).

Foodsourcing in Geneva Switzerland and the first urban “agrihood” in Detroit, USA, inspired BGEN BOQUIO and his Bde to come-up with the community farms, not only in Barangay Bud Bunga, but also in other Barangays such as Barangay Upper Sinumaan. It would ensure food on the table for the community residents.

The sustainable development of the natural resources and the environment, as seen in the community farms, has been an area of cooperation and coordination of between the civilian residents and the military resulting to peacebuilding in these barangays in Province of Sulu.

CONCLUSION

Environmental peacebuilding is a new discipline in environment and natural resource management. It acknowledges that though natural resources may bring conflict, environmental management and sustainable development of natural resources can be an area of coordination and cooperation resulting to peacebuilding. Environmental management can be used in the peace process. The environment and natural resources can promote and support peacebuilding through economic development and the generation of employment for the stakeholders. Likewise, cooperation over and protection of the shared environment and natural resources can give opportunities for peacebuilding. Integrating in the military’s civil military operations (CMO) the protection of the environment and sustainable development and management of natural resources are crucial for sustaining peace and security.

GLOSSARY

Conflict- Conflict is a dispute or incompatibility caused by the actual or perceived opposition of needs, values and interests. In political terms, conflict refers to wars or other struggles that involve the use of force (UNEP, 2009). Conflict is also defined as a protracted disagreement among two or more parties (Bruch, 2019). Violent conflict occurs when there is collective violence such as civil unrest, riots, isolated acts of terrorism, or other sporadic acts of violence (Bruch, 2019). Armed conflicts are political conflicts where the sustained use of armed forces results in at least 25 battle deaths and in which at least one of the two parties is a government of a state (Bruch, 2019). While post-conflict refers to the period following armed conflict; when violence is stopped but grievances, mistrust, and social conflict often persists (Bruch, 2019).

Ecosystem services- An ecosystem is a dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities, and the non-living environment interacting as a functional unit. Ecosystem services are the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that compose

them, sustain and fulfil human life. These include “provisioning services” such as food, water, timber, and fibre; “regulating services” that affect climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water quality; “cultural services” that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and “supporting services” such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling (UNEP, 2009).

Environment- The environment is the sum of all external conditions affecting the life, development and survival of an organism. In the context of this report, environment refers to the physical conditions that affect natural resources (climate, geology, hazards) and the ecosystem services that sustain them (e.g. carbon, nutrient and hydrological cycles) (UNEP, 2009).

Livelihood- A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. It is considered sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base (UNEP, 2009).

Natural resources- Natural resources are actual or potential sources of wealth that occur in a natural state, such as timber, water, fertile land, wildlife, minerals, metals, stones, and hydrocarbons. A natural resource qualifies as a renewable resource if it is replenished by natural processes at a rate comparable to its rate of consumption by humans or other users. A natural resource is considered non-renewable when it exists in a fixed amount, or when it cannot be regenerated on a scale comparative to its consumption (UNEP, 2009).

Peacebuilding- Peacebuilding comprises the identification and support of measures needed for transformation toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships and structures of governance, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. The four dimensions of peacebuilding are: socio-economic development, good governance, reform of justice and security institutions, and the culture of justice, truth and reconciliation (UNEP, 2009).

Peacekeeping- Peacekeeping is both a political and a military activity involving a presence in the field, with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor arrangements relating to the control of

conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces), and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements), as well as to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid (UNEP, 2009).

Peacemaking- Peacemaking is the diplomatic process of brokering an end to conflict, principally through mediation and negotiation, as foreseen under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (UNEP, 2009).

Security- “State or national security” refers to the requirement to maintain the survival of the nation-state through the use of economic, military and political power and the exercise of diplomacy. “Human security” is a paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities, which argues that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. Human security holds that a people-centered view of security is necessary for national, regional and global stability. “Environmental security” refers to the area of research and practice that addresses the linkages among the environment, natural resources, conflict and peacebuilding (UNEP, 2009).

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COMMODORE ROY VINCENT T TRINIDAD PN joined the Navy in 1991 and has spent 20 of his 30 years commissioned service with operational units of Naval Special Warfare, Intelligence and the Fleet. He has a Masters in Public Management degree, Major in Development and Security, and has undertaken local and foreign courses to include the Basic and the Advance Courses of Special Operations in Combatting Terrorism at the Joint Special Operations University, Tampa, Florida. Last 2012, COMMODORE TRINIDAD was invited as a plenary speaker to the 12th World Conference on Counter Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel. Prior to his current designation as Commander, Littoral Combat Force, Philippine Fleet, he was the Deputy Commander of the Naval Education, Training and Doctrine Command. His previous assignments include: Deputy Commander, Naval Forces Central concurrently Naval Task Force 51 Commander, the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Operations, N3, Director, Naval Operations Center and the Chief of Staff, Naval Forces Western. Mindanao and concurrently Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force-Zambasulta. He is currently taking up his Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Security Administration degree.

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In 2010, at the young age of 28, he served as Vice Governor of Northern Samar and led in the pursuit of the region's executive and legislative agenda centered on economic progress, environmental protection, youth empowerment, and peace and order.

He pursued further studies and earned a Master's in Public Management (MPM) degree from the Ateneo de Manila University School of Government (ASOG) in 2016. He likewise earned a Master in National Security and Administration (MNSA) degree from the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) in 2018 and a proud member of Regular Class 53. He was conferred the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration Major in Good Governance (Honoris Causa) by the Brethren Evangelical School of Theology in 2018 at the Clark 4D Theatre. He is an Army Reserve Officer holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel (LTC). Then Philippine Army Commanding General Lt. Gen. Gilbert I. Gapay donned LTC Uy with his LTC rank on January 23, 2020. Currently, he is currently taking his Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Security Administration (PASA) degree at the Bicol University Graduate School.

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Coastal Defense as a Philippine Army Mission

by Sgt Selwyn Clyde M. Alojipan PA (Res)

ABSTRACT

The Philippine Army can no longer afford to remain a ground-warfare-only combat branch in the face of new and rapidly advancing threats from beyond the shores of the Philippine Archipelago. It must develop the capability to detect and defend against seaborne and airborne threats coming from beyond the horizon, whether in the form of hostile naval warships, military aircrafts, unmanned drones, missiles, civilian crafts, and other launch platforms. The Army needs to create a sea mobile and/or airmobile interdiction combat unit that can be deployed to any of the country's islands or coastlines so it can threaten offensive action against sea-surface, subsurface, and airborne intruders or infiltrators. It needs to deploy ground-based "eyes-in-the-sky" sensor platforms to detect, track, and monitor maritime traffic in and around its oceanic borders to deter threats against the country's centers of gravity. The Army's current table of organization and equipment (TOE) needs to be reoriented and reorganized, not just for traditional ground warfare roles, but also for coastal sea-control and maritime defense duties. An archipelagic country's Army cannot limit its utility and role to just the dry land portions of its country's territory; it must be amphibious and able to deal with maritime threats and targets as far offshore as possible.

Keywords: Archipelagic geography, Coastal and littoral mobility, Maritime traffic interdiction, Coastal defense, Sea-control, Over-the-horizon threat detection, Anti-shipping warfare, Anti-submarine warfare, Anti-missile defense, Air defense, Aerostat radar platforms, Desalination Units, Tube Artillery, Missile Artillery, Air-assault troops, Counter-insurgency, Conventional warfare, Ground warfare, Logistics and Resupply, Maritime law, Law of the sea, Law enforcement.

COASTAL DEFENSE AS A PHILIPPINE ARMY

The Philippines is the world's second largest archipelago with 7,641 islands and a coastline longer

than that of the United States. It is also the biggest archipelago without any land borders. Its nearest neighbors are Palau to the east, Taiwan to the north, Vietnam to the west, Sabah on Borneo to the southwest, and Celebes (Indonesia) to the southeast. Being a group of islands without land borders, external threats to the country's territory come from the seas and oceans around it, as well as the various sea lanes passing between its islands, through which hostile foreign forces could easily enter and traverse without being detected.

The Philippines is also part of the "First Island Chain" which includes the Kuril Islands, Japan, Okinawa and the Bonin Islands, Taiwan, and Borneo, down to Singapore (Yoshihara, 2012). This chain of archipelagos between the South China Sea, Yellow Sea, and East China Sea on one side and the Philippine Sea of the Pacific Ocean on the other, with the Philippines and Okinawa in between, restricts Mainland China from having direct access to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean through various sea lane choke points. A "Second Island Chain" runs through the Marianas Islands and Palau to the rest of Indonesia and is held by the United States through the US Navy and US Air Force (with some US Army units) based in Hawaii and Guam.

Historically, the Philippine Army has always concerned itself with ground warfare and ground-based operations against local insurgents, foreign invaders, and/or ground warfare as part of international peacekeeping and conventional warfare operations. The Army has yet to conceptualize warfare against seaborne infiltrators and invaders or ways to extend coastal defenses beyond the shoreline. This land-based mindset and orientation needs to be revisited and reexamined because the geographic terrain of the Philippine Archipelago inextricably mixes and intertwines the terrestrial and maritime domains up into the upper atmosphere and near orbital space.

For the Philippine Army to ignore extending its reach beyond the shoreline means to be ineffective in helping defend the country's territory from hostile

foreign infiltrators and invaders before actually setting foot on Philippine soil (becoming “feet-dry” in aviation parlance). It also leaves some small islands that, currently, have no deployed military assets and are basically defenseless. This allows any criminal or foreign element to use these locations as a way to infiltrate the country.

This paper proposes a set of concepts and doctrines to enable military planners to establish and develop the country’s Coastal Defense provided by the Philippine Army.

In order to perform this expanded mission, designated Army units will need to familiarize themselves and gain experience in surveilling, navigating, as well as traveling through and staying in a variety of intermingled terrestrial and aquatic or maritime features found in Philippine geographic and topological areas. This could range from flat, submerged, vegetated, and elevated inland areas to swamps, estuaries, mudflats, fishponds, lagoons, sandbars, beaches, rocky outcrops, caves, seaside cliffs, reefs, shoals, shallow waters, drop-offs, deep water, and various man-made coastal structures. Army troopers will need to gain experience traversing riverine, littoral, and shore-based terrain features by foot, swimming, or using specialized vehicles—just as their counterparts in the Philippine Marines, Navy, and Coast Guard do on a regular basis.

CURRENT ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY

The Philippine Army is the largest branch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with 101,000 regular soldiers backed by 100,000 ready reserves, and is responsible for ground warfare (Philippine Army Website, 2022). Currently, the PA’s combat units are organized into 11 infantry divisions, one (1) armor division, one (1) combined arms brigade, one (1) artillery regiment, five (5) engineering brigades, one (1) aviation regiment, and seven (7) combat support units based across the archipelago. Its regular units are dedicated to both counter-insurgency and conventional army operations.

The Army’s 1st “Aegis” Brigade Combat Team (BCT) serves as the single combined-arms rapid-deployment force and major maneuver unit for incident response and conventional warfare. The Armor Division is composed of two (2) mechanized brigade headquarters with six (6) mechanized infantry battalions, seven (7) separate cavalry squadrons, a maintenance unit, and an aviation arm.

The Army’s single aviation regiment is part of the Armor Division and is responsible for reconnaissance and airborne operations such as aerial transport and medical evacuation duties but will soon be responsible for future air support operations. The Army’s single artillery regiment has nine (9) field artillery battalions, one (1) self-propelled artillery battalion consisting of two (2) batteries, two (2) multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) batteries, one (1) land-based missile system (LBMS), and two (2) air defense artillery batteries.

Devising, prototyping, and testing the still-to-be-developed techniques and doctrines of “mobile sea-control artillery” will require creating a unit from scratch or reorganizing one of the Army’s existing artillery battalions or missile batteries.

EXAMPLES OF COASTAL DEFENSE MISSIONS

With today’s increasing advances in sensor, logistics, transport, and weapon technologies, it is possible for the Army’s combat units, in the field or inside its bases, to be struck and demolished by hostile forces located offshore— i.e., by firing stand-off air-launched, ballistic missiles, or via guided glide bombs and hypersonic guided vehicles. It is about time the PA considers acquiring the means and capabilities needed for attacking these hostile foreign forces when they get within range of similar and deployable AFP defensive and offensive technologies.

For example, an Army coastal defense missile battery quickly transported to an island would be able to detect and launch anti-ship missiles or fire tube artillery (guns and cannons) at nearby water-borne or flying intruders. It should also be able to defend itself against air or missile attack from hostile warships or aircrafts, so anti-missile and air defense should be an organic component of such a unit. To provide mobility and combat support to such unit, suitable logistics and sensor assets from the Philippine Navy, Philippine Air Force, as well as the rest of the Philippine Army, can be assigned as needed. With an Army long-range bombardment unit interdicting the airspace and surface areas around an island or coast, maritime infiltrators, smugglers, pirates, and other hostile intruders can be attacked and prevented from conducting nefarious activities in Philippine territorial waters.

Similar to the separate Cavalry squadrons belonging to the Army’s Armor Division, a force of multiple separate rapid-reaction “mobile sea-control artillery batteries or battalions” could be established,

equipped, trained, and deployed to the various far-flung islands or coastal areas of the country. They would be able to detect, track, monitor, harass, interdict, and destroy enemy intruders within a few kilometers (1-10 or more km) from the shore. In this case, such Army units will be able to focus their attention not only on ground-based insurgents, but also on offshore intruders and possible invaders. With the purchase of specialized anti-submarine mines, torpedoes, and advanced anti-ship munitions, even howitzers can be used to sink enemy subsurface vessels that are trying to interdict the country's busiest harbors and ports — these places can have underwater sentries in the form of hydrophones and other anti-submarine defenses. An example of emerging antisubmarine technologies is the SMART (Supersonic Missile-Assisted Release of Torpedo) system developed by India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) (Kulkarni, 2020). Such an Army artillery unit can cover not just the land areas but also the nearby coastal terrain and waters where such hostile forces might traverse.

In the future, it might be advisable for Army high command to consider creating a "Coastal Artillery" or "Maritime Operations" branch, or even a specialized division, that would consolidate the doctrine, equipment, training, operations, maintenance, and logistics of the PA's expanded mission into the coastal domain.

OVERALL CONCEPT FOR TEMPORARY ISLAND FIRE BASES

The Philippines has multiple islets and small islands from which it can base a small, stealthy, self-sufficient, and self-contained high-tech missile or tube artillery battery for temporary deployments. If the M142 HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) missile launchers, self-propelled howitzers (SPH), wheeled mobile howitzers (WMH), and/or towed artillery cannons can be deployed on stable flat-bed barges that are first towed, prepositioned, anchored in sheltered inlets or coves, and then camouflaged, then the artillery battery can shoot specialized anti-ship or anti-aircraft missiles or artillery shells at enemy targets offshore or fire ordinary artillery shells at any target inland, even in darkness (Ong, 2020). Once they have launched munitions at a hostile target, such a unit mounted on barges can quickly move to another location, similar to the "shoot-and-scoot" tactics used by modern artillery units to avoid counter-battery fire (Shim, 2017).

These small islands can thus serve as temporary harboring, waypoint, shelter, cover, and concealment areas for the PA's rapid combat deployment of bombardment and interdiction units. The Philippine Army itself is well-versed in setting up artillery fire bases on land — a technique that can be adapted to water-borne operations. Certain strategically located islands, or on-shore "fire bases," can be pre-selected to strategically defend inter-island waters. These, and other pre-selected locations, can also have pre-positioned supplies so they can serve as emergency resupply depots for other AFP maritime patrol units operating in the same area. The Army Support Command can contract and/or commandeer the use of commercial and civilian transport ferries as needed, especially those with roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) capabilities, to deliver and pick up troops, equipment, and supplies to these islands.

Each separate "mobile sea-control artillery" unit can be supported with suitable air-assault (heliborne) infantry and security teams, helicopter transports, wheeled transport or armored vehicles, mobile air defense, amphibious transport vehicles or ships, as well as sensor and command-and-control units that provide a variety of support capabilities. It is also advisable to equip such units with their own portable (truck-mounted) seawater desalination units so they are not dependent on local freshwater sources. Another necessary requirement is providing these independent units with their own diesel-powered electricity generator/s to power the various electrical devices that are deployed on hilltops or isolated islets.

The Army can't just leave the defense of the Philippine coastline to the Philippine Marine Corps because the Corps is not big enough to handle all the defensive and sea-control missions that the Army can be equipped and trained for. While the Philippine Marines can handle certain tasks well, such as an amphibious assault on enemy held coastal areas and islands, securing strategically located islands and the areas around them is better suited for the Army. Also, the Army has far more paratroopers and airmobile troops than the Philippine Marines can ever deploy, and can thus cover threats in multiple locations.

The Philippine Army will also need to collaborate closely, and frequently, with the Philippine Coast Guard and the Philippine National Police, as well as other government law-enforcement agencies who have police powers to conduct inspections, ship boardings, arrests, confiscations, evidence-

gathering, and other investigative functions that could involve Philippine citizens, unknown foreign nationals, known terrorists and criminal elements, and hostile foreign forces. Rules of engagement will need to be agreed upon, approved, and properly obeyed in cases of suspicious or hostile acts committed in the Army units' areas of operation, especially with regards to foreign vessels in Philippine or international waters.

It is the responsibility of each AFP regional command to identify and designate the islands and near-shore areas on the inhabited islands in their operational areas for possible deployment of these specialized Army sea-control defense units.

DETECTING OVER-WATER THREATS TO ARCHIPELAGO

Before threats can enter Philippine airspace and territorial waters, however, they need to be detected, tracked, and targeted by the military's various branches (Army, Navy + Marines, and Air Force). An Army combat unit tasked to interdict and bombard over-water threats would require long-range and persistent computerized and encrypted command and targeting information to be delivered to them by various other military assets such as:

- 1) Ground- based or waterborne coastwatchers and forward observers with advanced scouting and surveillance devices and encrypted data link radio gear;
- 2) Link- 16 NATO and US-standard military tactical data link network and friendly Link-16 platforms (warships and warplanes);
- 3) Dedicated AWACS- type (Airborne Warning and Control System) command-and-control aircraft operated by friendly allied units, or even the AFP in the future;
- 4) Satellite- based data feeds from friendly allied countries;
- 5) Lighthouses and naval bases operated by the Philippine Government, upgraded into fixed radar and tethered aerostat radar system (TARS) (balloon-borne radar antennas) stations such as the Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) for long-range (100 km), over-the-horizon detection of unknown or hostile maritime intruders; and

6) Smaller mobile tethered aerostat radar system (TARS) (balloon-borne radar antennas), called the Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS), operated by specialized Philippine Army units of the Signal Corps.

Capabilities #5 and #6 mentioned above are based on the US Coast Guard and US Army's Border Surveillance Stations along the US-Mexican border and the US southern coastline facing the Caribbean Sea used to interdict drug smuggling and human trafficking runs by criminal organizations and possibly terrorists (Pollacheck, 2012; "Sentinels of the Sky," (no date)). These capabilities would be extremely helpful in securing the "southern backdoor" of the Philippines: the Sulu Archipelago and Palawan. Basically, the radar aerostats (tethered balloons carrying large radar antennas) act as "low-level satellites" or "eyes-in-the-sky" that can look downward beyond the curvature of the Earth's surface and detect non-stealth intruders into Philippine airspace and territorial waters.

CONCEPT OF A MOBILE FLOATING BASE OR AIR MOBILE QUICK- RESPONSE UNIT

While the Army is going to be focused on the use of the Philippine Archipelago's thousands of small islands as possible bases for sea-control, the Philippine Navy can also fulfill an adjunct or complementary role with the use of RO/RO or amphibious dock platform landing ships that provide a similar function, except that they can change locations in secret.

Mobile base ships can be equipped with a radar aerostat and a hangar to carry its own search and patrol helicopters. Their built-in RO/RO and amphibious lift capacity can carry an Army Cavalry troop (with light armored vehicles, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles) to effectively patrol the peripheral roads of many island provinces that don't have a permanent Army detachment. Adding further sealift capacity with more amphibious dock landing ships can allow an entire Army Cavalry squadron to be landed and deployed on any island province that requires such a deployment (such as when there are confirmed foreign or criminal groups occupying portions of national territory).

The Philippine Air Force can also have a counterpart airlift capability if it acquires more C-130 Hercules transports, V-22 Ospreys, or heavy-lift cargo helicopters similar to the CH-53 Sea Stallion ("Jolly Green Giant") or S-64 "Skycrane" helicopters.

The latter type of firefighting and logging helicopters are being fitted as drones for remote-control flight (Atherton, 2021). Even wingships (see next segment), a modern version of the flying boat, would allow any airmobile Army unit (Cavalry, Artillery, Infantry, Aviation, or Marines) to be quickly airlifted to any coastal province to perform sea-control or conventional warfare missions once WIG (wing-in-ground effect) technology becomes fully developed.

RAPID OVER-WATER DEPLOYMENT AND RESUPPLY

At the moment, the Philippines is still slowly acquiring and accumulating a fleet of commercial catamarans and RO/RO ferries to connect various island provinces together through the Nautical Highway System. The catamarans can carry mostly passengers at relatively fast speeds of up to 30-40 knots but they can be contracted to transport a platoon or company of Army or Marine troopers to any island that needs to be defended or reinforced with light infantry; the commercial ferries would not need to engage in combat but can be escorted by naval warships or Coast Guard vessels. Following after these passenger transports can be one or more RO/RO civilian ferries or Navy amphibious landing ships carrying vehicles, artillery, and massive military supplies but traveling at a slower pace.

If the Army had a rapid deployment Cavalry squadron or company-sized troop organized to travel via ferries and landing craft, they could readily be transported from one naval base to a shoreline or island threatened by hostile forces. Such a unit based in Camiguin Island, for example, can quickly send military troop and vehicle reinforcements to any part of northern Mindanao's coastline or to the southern shores of Iloilo, Negros, Siquijor, Bohol, and Leyte. Such rapid-reaction platoons and companies that can quickly be deployed overnight or in darkness from offshore provides many advantages for conducting impromptu covert and stealthy military operations.

In the near future (i.e., two decades), the prospect of an advanced aircraft technology called the Wing-in-Ground-effect (WIG) flying "wingships" — also called flaeships and ekranoplans in Russian — can enable fast cargo transport over water at flying speeds (greater than 100 knots). These "flyingship" prototypes are still being developed for commercialization in the near future but prospects are bright for these maritime "seaplanes" or "wingships" to not only

increase the economic activities of small islands but also have military applications (Wingship.com, 2013). Basically, these wingships can transport much more cargo than ordinary aircrafts with greater fuel efficiency and at speeds so much faster than any boat or ship. Equipped with active and passive sensors and a variety of weapons, wingships can patrol and monitor vast swaths of open water or crowded sea lanes (Flyingship.co, 2022). They can also call-in additional naval or air assets as reinforcements, as demonstrated by the famous PBY Catalinas and other flying boats of World War II.

However, many more wingships, whether civilian-owned or government-owned, can just deploy Army or Marine coastal interdictor troops to any island that needs to be inspected and occupied temporarily. Once they secure the island, follow-on deployment of the Army's sea-control artillery units can help secure the maritime areas reachable by their cannons and missiles. The same wingships that carried the infantry to the island can also take them off the island and later return with additional supplies for a lengthy stay by the sea-control artillery unit.

LONG ENDURANCE AND PERSISTENCE PRESENCE

Army combat units can be deployed to any small island (or any isolated location inland) and stay for a few days without resupply. The limiting factor is not food (in the form of field rations), ammunition, or fuel to power their portable electricity generators, but it is the continuous need to resupply safe drinking water for the men. Without a reliable resupply of potable water, any combat unit becomes combat-ineffective within 2-5 days. It is thus desirable to purchase a generous number (several dozens to hundreds) of miniature air-portable sea-water desalination units that can convert sea water or swamp water to drinkable freshwater (Dhar, 2022). Thus, any sea-control unit deployed to a small island or isolated coastline (e.g., surrounded by cliffs or swamps) needs to have its own portable desalination equipment and water storage tanks or bladders (which could be designed with rollers/wheels and float on the sea).

With drinking water supply assured, Army coastal defense units just require a resupply of fuel, ammunition, and food once-a-week for them to stay at their location for weeks, even months, without needing to be pulled out. It is understood that the troops and personnel deployed can undertake minimal fishing, food-gathering,

or foraging activities, as long as it does not compromise their security or allow easy detection by the enemy (strict radio emissions control, camouflage, stealth, etc.). Clandestine resupply missions can be undertaken by various existing air, naval, or ground-based AFP units. This function might even be performed by allied submarines such as what the US Navy did for the Filipino guerrillas during World War II (Baños, 2020).

DECEPTION, PERSUASION, AND/OR INTIMIDATION MISSIONS

After the Philippine Army has effectively and consistently practiced, and demonstrated, its doctrines of rapid mobility and enduring persistence in isolated islands of the archipelago, including successfully controlling the maritime battlespace around it, it will be desirable to perform this skill for propaganda and deterrence purposes.

By that time in the future, most of the criminal and foreign threats to the country will have already learned of the capabilities of the AFP in conducting coastal defense or sea-control missions and may opt to either (1) avoid confrontation with the AFP altogether, or (2) attempt to conduct covert intrusions, infiltration, transits, occupations, exfiltration, trafficking, and other illegal activities in defiance of the Philippine government. Large-scale, high-intensity, invasion-level foreign army assaults on the Philippines may also be possible but not probable on the spectrum of conflict scenarios.

To prevent or deter any hostile group's attempt to enter and/ or take control of any portion of the Philippine Archipelago for the rest of the 21st Century, the AFP must be able to demonstrate that it can secretly deploy advanced weapons to any of the country's islands and coastal areas and launch precision-guided weapon (PGW) attacks on hostile units it has detected, encountered, and monitored. These hostile groups might be in the form of local insurgents, international terrorists, amorphous criminal syndicates, clandestine foreign agents, or conventional foreign military forces (ships, aircraft, and soldiers).

Sun Tzu's Art of War gives this advice to armies: "Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak." It is thus prudent for the AFP to be able to conduct a range of sea-control missions either covertly (in secret and with full surprise) or overtly

(with full media coverage and cinematography). The ability to launch advanced weapons and destroy intruders without their knowledge will prove very intimidating and dissuading to many small and less-lavishly equipped hostile forces. It will also introduce uncertainty into the minds of enemy military planners because these mobile AFP sea-control units can make it harder for enemy units to accomplish their missions (whatever these may be) inside Philippine territory. Sometimes the best defense is to create believable propaganda (backed up by some real accomplishments) to make the enemy back down and feel unsure of the outcome.

CONCLUSION

The Philippine Army can no longer afford to limit its capabilities to just attacking and destroying targets on dry land. Modern weapons can now be launched from any platform (vehicle or base) and hit targets anywhere in the country. If missiles can be launched at Philippine cities and centers of gravity from somewhere in the Philippine Sea (the westernmost portion of the Pacific Ocean) or from the Verde Island Passage or the Tañon Strait (examples of inter-island waters), then the Philippine Army must be able to handle such threats or fail its mission of "Serving the People and Securing the Land."

The Army, not just the Navy and the Air Force of the AFP, must be able to "find, fix, flank, and finish" the enemy wherever it is located — whether in the air, at sea, or on an uninhabited island within the Philippine Archipelago. The Army must defend Philippine territory, and that includes domains of land, sea, aerospace, and cyberspace. The Army must equip itself to guard against and neutralize hostile threats launched from, above, and beneath the sea surface. This can be done by properly selecting available and future weapons and sensor systems, as well as through the acquisition of logistics and sustenance materiel resources for short-to-long-term deployment in any of the country's islands, sandbars, reefs, and shoals.

Imagine a Philippine Army that is able to protect the country from attackers at sea or in the air kilometers away from the main land and still below the horizon. Imagine tethered balloons with advanced radars set up at government lighthouses or anywhere along the coast (such as on strategic hilltops) to detect and track the presence of illegal intruders trying to hide themselves amid normal commercial traffic.

Imagine the country's major ports protected from enemy submarines by an array of underwater defenses manned by the Philippine Navy, able to call for timely and accurate anti-submarine and anti-ship fire support from a nearby Army battalion. Imagine a criminal pirate base, clandestinely set up and operating at the tip of Palawan, suddenly raided and assaulted by Philippine Marines while supported by an Army artillery battery firing from another island. This is a concept and vision for a much bigger role than what is currently performed by the Philippine Army. It is a concept for warfighting with advanced 21st-Century weapons and tactics not currently envisioned by today's generation of Army officers and personnel. However, by embracing this new vision and mission, the upgraded and re-oriented Philippine Army will be able to take on its primary role of external defense against foreign aggressors while still retaining an effective multi-role capability against insurgents and conventional hostile forces that may have managed to reach the islands. By the second half of the 21st Century, the Philippine Army will have become highly capable of securing not just the land but also sea approaches to the Philippines.

Future hypothetical conversation: *"Sir, our vessel has been hit by cannon fire from an island inside Philippine territory." Response: "Are you sure it's from that island and not from a warship? They're 15 kilometers away!"*

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In 2017-2019, he joined the 1st Battalion, 1302nd (Quezon City) Ready Reserve Infantry Brigade, as an active-duty Sergeant of the 1302nd Community Defense Center, Philippine Army Reserves, after getting training on Troop Leading Procedures with the Guam National Guard.

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Lessons in Ukraine - The Importance of a Reserve Force

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On the 21st of February 2022, President Vladimir Putin made headlines when he announced that the Russian government would recognize the sovereignty of the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics, two contested areas of Russia found within Ukraine's borders. With this proclamation, Russian troops started pouring into the region with the public intent as "peacekeeping" forces, but it was not long before an all-out invasion of Ukraine commenced, with strike groups heading straight for the country's capital, Kiev.

On paper, the difference in military strength between the two former Soviet republics is incomparable: one of them is a superpower, sporting the second most powerful military in the world with almost 900,000 active personnel and large deployments and stockpiles of weapons and equipment. The other is a middling power with around 200,000 active personnel and Soviet-era equipment. Almost everyone expected that the Russians would make short work of the Ukrainians, yet more than four months later, the invasion has come to a halt and President Putin is still far from achieving his war goals.

A significant contributor to this unlikely success of the Ukrainians can be attributed to the mass mobilization of its reserve force. Upon the beginning of the Russian offensive, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had the parliament proclaim a 30-day nationwide state of emergency and ordered the mobilization of all reservists. This force of 2.5 million strong helped bridge the gap between the military discrepancy of the nations. Since Russia can only commit around 220 thousand of its personnel in the conflict, this caused Ukraine to gain a significant local numerical superiority over the invaders within the country.

These recently mobilized reservists are not necessarily incorporated into armed forces for frontline duty. Instead, they are being integrated into a new branch of the military which is called the Territorial Defense Force. The idea behind this new branch is to utilize well-trained civilian reservists around the country and form them around a core group of professional soldiers. This new force is to help combat Russia's aggression — with missions ranging from direct military attacks, to underhanded missions with aims to sow cultural discord, sabotage infrastructure and hijack local governments.

The Russia-Ukraine Military Imbalance

Comparison of selected military statistics for Russia and Ukraine in 2022



Source: GlobalFirepower



statista

The military power difference between Russia and Ukraine. Source: Statista and Global Firepower.



*Ukrainian reservists undergoing military training with dummy rifles.
Source: Yahoo News*

The foundation of this Territorial Defense Force could be traced back last January 1, when Ukraine passed a law making its Territorial Defense Force a separate military branch. The force, which was initially conceived in the early 2000s and first put together in 2014, was composed of retired military members divided into units resembling volunteer battalions who answered to the ground forces command. Their job at first was simply to provide support to the main Ukrainian army and defend the flanks and rear. Now however, with the threat that Russia may be looking to infiltrate cities with agents alongside with its massive troop build-up, this civilian force was codified, strengthened, and given additional responsibilities for the furtherance of its mandate. While the initial goal is for a core of 10,000 military professionals to lead 130,000 civilian reservists, the war caused the force to seek up to 2 million citizens willing to defend their homes, families and country. Millions of citizens answered the call, and the volunteers, who came from disparate backgrounds, were provided basic military training. The program was not without its obstacles, however. As a new force, it faced many administrative and logistical challenges as it expanded too quickly. Delays in recruitment and arming of the volunteers cost the Ukrainian government much of its vital time.

Despite this, the Territorial Defense Force has proven to be a valuable asset for the smaller country to hold back and even win against the militarily superior aggressor.

Since the start of the conflict however, military assistance in the form of weapons, ammunition and equipment poured into Ukraine from the United States and countries in the European Union among others. Thousands of rifles, anti-tank and anti-air missiles and other military supplies were supplied by these countries in an effort to contain Russia. These countries were unable to send personnel on the ground as this would risk escalating the conflict, yet the supplies were more than welcome to arm the thousands of recently mobilized forces in the Territorial Defense Force. In the modern era of warfare between state actors, we have seen that even if direct intervention is avoided as a means of assistance, a country at war can expect at least material support for its war efforts, especially from the political rivals of the perceived aggressor.

With the aforementioned situations in mind, it is certain that there are at least three lessons we could take away from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict:



Javelin anti-tank missiles, delivered as part of the United States's security assistance to Ukraine. Source: Al Jazeera

1) A strong reserve force is necessary to deter a militarily superior enemy. While reservists are not as effective in offensive operations, they have proven to be as capable as standing forces in defensive ones, especially when protecting their homes and localities. This means that even a small unit of reservists that have relatively little training and underequipped can hold their own against the regular troops of an aggressor after morale and geographical mastery have been factored in. The fact that reserve forces are usually stationed locally means that they can easily gain local numerical superiority on an overextended enemy force.

2) A well-established reserve force is an effective reserve force. Simply having a large number of reservists is not enough in order to say that a reserve unit possesses the necessary capabilities to fulfill its mandate. A strong tradition and extensive experience are also necessary in order to ensure that each of the reservists are properly trained and organized to respond to local and even national needs of the state.

3) In times of conflict, material support can be expected but the country should rely on its own manpower and mobilization. When considering a response to a potential invasion, the country should focus more on its available personnel rather than on equipment. As was seen in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, weapon systems, ammunition, sustenance, and other war resources and equipment poured in almost immediately once the conflict became dire, yet even the most vocal opposition against Russia have yet to send any combat troops to assist the Ukrainians.

This is because doing so risk escalating tensions and have more dire political consequences than material support. When a foreign aggression does arise, we are almost assured of subsidized war resources from our allies, yet we can only rely on our armed forces and our populace to fight our battles and resist an invading force.

Perhaps the situation between Ukraine and Russia could almost be compared to that between the Philippines and China: the first one is a middling power with a large population with a moderately capable military, while the latter is a much larger country, and a militarily powerhouse with claims and disputed regions to the territories of the former. With these parallels in mind, it is best that we must emulate the lessons learned from Ukraine in order to further boost our national security against external threats.



Volunteers who completed the 45-day Basic Civilian Military Training (BCMT). Source: 11th Infantry Division

An obvious answer in order to deter an aggressor is to ensure that our military capabilities are in the same league as theirs. A simple solution for this is to match their number of military personnel, often in terms of the standing force. This increase in personnel, however, also raises the obvious question of how these new soldiers will be paid and equipped. Even now, almost half of the more than Php200 billion budget of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) already goes towards salaries and allowances of its personnel. This does not include how more than a quarter of the budget already goes to the pension of veterans and retirees.

It is therefore clear that matching the number of personnel of a large country like China is not practical. They possess a much larger economy and budget that ours cannot match.

What could be considered, however, is the expansion of our Citizen Armed Force (CAF). The CAF provides the AFP a base for expansion of war, invasion, or rebellion. They also work to assist in relief and rescue during disaster or calamities, in socioeconomic development, and in the operation and maintenance of essential government or private utilities. What this means is that we have a force that can be mobilized in cases of emergency, but is not a financial burden in peacetime. Through the expansion of the CAF, we can boost the number of our military personnel that will serve as a deterrent against foreign aggression, without inflating our military expenses.



BCMT trainees undergo limited warfighting course. Source: Reserve Command, Philippine Army

Currently, there are a total of around 700,000 reservists for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, although only a small part of that number is considered as ready-reserve. While this number may seem large in isolation, especially in comparison to the standing force that numbers only less than 200 thousand personnel, it is not as large as compared to other countries. Taiwan, a country with less than a quarter of the population of the Philippines, has a combined standing and reserve force almost twice that of our country, numbering 1.8 million men.

Vietnam, our close neighbor to the east who is also wary of China's expansionism and aggression, has even more, at almost 5.5 million men. This is five times larger than the Armed Forces of the Philippines despite the fact that they have a slightly smaller population and economy compared to ours. Despite having the 13th largest population in the world, the Philippines only has the 22nd largest reserve force, revealing a possible shortcoming in how we treat the importance of a strong reserve force.



402CDC Personnel conducts Battalion Assembly Test. Source: 402CDC

It now comes into question on what could be done in order to address this gap in reserve force strength. A common idea that is floated around is the reimposition of the mandatory ROTC. Even now, a significant portion of the enlisted reservists comes from those who were able to finish Military Science 1 and 2 as part of the ROTC programs in universities, which totals to around 100 thousand new enlisted reservists every year. This, however, is but a fraction of the number of enlistees before ROTC was made voluntary, which peaked at around a million new reservists per year. It can be seen that making the program mandatory would be a quick fix to expand the reserve force.

A common argument against this expansion is that personnel alone would not be sufficient, and that these new recruits would need weapons and equipment, which in turn demands more funding. This is the initial concern that we are trying to avoid in the first place by expanding the CAF instead of the standing force. These concerns are well-founded, after all, the training of reservists will require material logistics, and for them to be effective in any conflict, they must be well-equipped.



*ROTC cadets marching in formation.
Source: SU ROTC*

What we have learned in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict however, is that equipment is easy to come by, but manpower is not.

At the onset of the Russian invasion, the Ukrainian government received vast amounts of weapons and equipment from the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union, yet these countries did not directly intervene nor send troops in fears of escalating the tension. Therefore, the Ukrainian Armed Forces focused on calling up volunteers to take up the assortment of rifles, anti-tank systems, and anti-air weapons that they received. The reason for the absence of troops being sent to Ukraine by foreign nations is that material support has historically been easier to supply than outright intervention. Examples include how the United States only provided lend-lease support to its allies in the opening years of World War 2, only getting involved in the actual fighting much later on. This is because for the public, a few millions spent on military hardware is much more acceptable than casualties to their country's armed forces. By the same reasoning, it is therefore more important to train as many available reservists as we can despite possible equipment shortages, as it will be the limiting factor in an event of war or invasion.

Therefore, based on the aforementioned reasons and lessons, expanding the reserve force is the best possible solution that we can do in order to address this hypothetical scenario where we are put in the same situation as that of Ukraine. In addition, it must be ensured that our reservists have retained the necessary skills and knowledge that they have gained during their initial training in order to prove effective in case of a mass mobilization. As of the moment, our main pool of reservists are taken from the programs Basic Civilian Military Training (BCMT) catered for working adults, and Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) for tertiary students. While these programs provide the initial training required, most of the graduates of these courses will be put on standby reserve and no longer receive any additional training except for the few that will eventually want to pursue commissionship. These programs have also faced recent challenges from the onslaught of the COVID pandemic as Departments of Military Science and Tactics (DMSTs) all around the country were forced to conduct their Military Science courses online, and the number of BCMT courses were reduced due to lower numbers of volunteers who enlisted for the training.

While we can continue to entertain possibilities of mandatory military service or the return of required citizen military training, what we can do now is to start to strengthen the existing institutions and programs we have for the reserve force. Perhaps, instead of establishing new DMSTs in senior high schools all over the country, what we can do is to strengthen and add funding to our existing DMSTs in the different tertiary institutions, colleges and universities. There are still many State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) that are forced to cross-enroll their ROTC cadets in other schools due to lack of facilities and training staff, while some completely do not offer ROTC as an option due to a combination of factors including but not limited to lack of nearby institutions that offers ROTC or sparse interest among its student population.



ROTC cadets are taught rifle drill using Zoom virtual telecommunication.. Source: UPD ROTC

In order to emulate the success of Ukraine against Russia, we should be prioritizing funding to our ROTC programs and allocating the necessary personnel to man the various DMSTs in our tertiary institutions as soon as we can. We should not wait for a disaster or an imminent threat to arise before we try to improve the capabilities of our reserve force. As with Ukraine, we have seen that training and administration of quality soldiers takes time, with our current programs taking up from 45-days for the BCMT, up to a whole academic year for the ROTC programs, which may not be fast enough in terms of crises, where every day counts. Rushing military training will only make it more vulnerable to obstacles that can hamper its effectiveness. Any expansion or modification in our existing institutions of the reserve force would and should take time, as any sudden changes may result in disorganization and ineffectiveness of the capabilities of our forces. Reorganization and the establishment of new policies is not instantaneous, both in a practical and bureaucratic sense, and it is

imperative that we start now in order to ensure that the Citizen Armed Force will be properly funded, supported, and reinforced to fulfill its mandate should the need ever arise. The best time to have strengthened the capabilities of our reservists was 20 years ago, which would have resulted in us having a large and capable reserve force by now, but the second- best time is in the present, so that we may be properly prepared to defend our country as soon as we can.

The road to having a modern and expanded reserve force will not be easy, and it will certainly be not cheap, yet when it comes to securing the sovereignty of the country and Filipino people, the costs should be secondary to our mission. It is only through a strong and effective Citizen Armed Force that each Filipino can rest easy, knowing that their freedom and democracy are well defended by our brave soldiers and reservists.

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